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ABSTRACT 
 
The inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy is typically rationalized as 
corresponding to the fundamental Canadian value of r spect for human rights; however, 
Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, altruism, and 
morality, have not produced a substantive policy that adequately considers or sufficiently 
protects human rights.  Although human rights are generally considered subordinate to 
security, economic, and other national interests, this hesis will argue that these are 
mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support each other.  By examining Canadian 
engagement in Afghanistan through the theoretical perspective of the English School 
solidarists, this thesis contends that Canada national interest can be realized through a 
commitment to a human rights foreign policy, thereby providing concrete justification for 
the inclusion of human rights in Canadian foreign policy. The objective of such an 
approach is to improve Canada’s ability to protect and promote international human 
rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of Canadian foreign policy-makers that there is 
undeniable value in a human rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce 
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1. Introduction: A Case for a Canadian Human Rights Foreign 
Policy 
In November 1965, renowned Canadian foreign policy expert James Eayrs gave 
the Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lectures at Carleton University in Ottawa with a two-part 
lecture called “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy.”1  In this lecture, he promoted 
“practical idealism” as a compromise between the harshness of realism and the folly of 
idealism.2  Forty years after these lectures, Canadian foreign policy scholar Kim Richard 
Nossal replied by modifying Eayrs’ term to “liberal ealist” to better reflect typical realist 
notions of power, the anarchic world system, and interstate competition, but also 
recognize that international relations are fundamentally liberal in the way that states 
interact, accept diversity, and progressively work towards institutionalizing mutually 
beneficial rules and norms.3  Nossal describes Eayrs’ characterization of a middle ground 
approach between realism and idealism as a helpful tool to analyze Canada’s foreign 
policy,4 which can be extended to examine the place of human rights in Canadian foreign 
policy. 
The idea of a via media between realism and liberal cosmopolitanism was taken 
up by the English School as a way to recognize the tensions between what were the two 
dominant international theories during the Cold War.  One of the most well-known 
members of the English School, Hedley Bull, had “realism and rationalism yoked 
                                                
1 The Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lectures were presented at Carleton University in Ottawa on 18-20 
November 1965.  These lectures were published in 1966 by University of Toronto Press. 
2 James Eayrs, Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 29. 
3 Kim Richard Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On: Realism and Idealism in 
Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 62.2 (2007): 269. 
4 Ibid, 276. 
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together in his nature.”5  Certain theoretical perspectives of the English Sc ool represent 
an opportunity to reconcile the state-centric, self-interested principles of realism and the 
liberal utopian tendencies of cosmopolitanism, without necessarily producing a synthesis 
of the two.  The admixture that emerges provides clarity to explain how Canada operates 
in international affairs and how it prioritizes the many requirements of its foreign policy, 
including the protection and promotion of human rights. 
Current Canadian foreign policy reflects Canada’s internationalist and multilateral 
practices.6  Traditionally, Canadian foreign policy incorporates a commitment to global 
stability, its prosperity and security, and reflects Canadian values.7  Canada’s 
international human rights policy is characterized, at least publicly, only through the lens 
of values.  The Department of Foreign Affairs and Iternational Trade (DFAIT) claims 
that, “Canada has been a consistently strong voice f r the protection of human rights and 
the advancement of democratic values.”8  Canada has the ability to contribute to the 
positive management of global challenges, but, according to some scholars, has failed to 
live up to its potential.  Along with Nossal in his response to Eayrs’ 1965 lecture,9 other 
prominent Canadian scholars such as Andrew Cohen and Je nifer Welsh deride the 
effectiveness of Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s faltering place in the world in 
                                                
5 R. J. Vincent, “Hedley Bull and Order in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 17.2 (1988): 210. 
6 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 226-232. 
7 Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly, “Conclusion: Understanding Canada’s Foreign 
Policy Challenges,” in Handbook of Canadian Foreign, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc. J. 
O’Reilly (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 520. 
8 DFAIT, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy,” Date modified 10 December 2008, 
www.international.gc.ca/rights-droits/policy-politique.aspx. 
9 Kim Richard Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On,” 277. 
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their recent respective works.10  After years of budget cuts, Canada’s foreign policy 
bureaucracy has come to be less eager to advance Canada’s global position and 
understands that Canada is not to be a key player int nationally.11  Canada’s lagging 
leadership is also being noticed on the internationl stage.  In a particularly unflattering 
2007 report, Amnesty International Canada expressed it  concern that “…remarkable 
Canadian leadership in the struggle to shore up human rights protection around the 
world…has recently begun to slip.”12   
There is considerable debate surrounding what motivates a country’s foreign 
policy.  Even though it is sometimes presented as a priori, this idea of a value-based 
foreign policy for Canada has been much maligned by several scholars in the field, which 
begs the question of whether foreign policy is the place for altruistic priorities or 
platitudes.  One report that highlights this is a 2003 Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute (CDFAI) study titled, “In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy 
in an Insecure World.”  In this report, Nossal, along with Eayrs’ former colleague Denis 
Stairs and several other influential foreign policy scholars suggest that Canada place 
more emphasis on projecting Canadian interests rather than Canadian values in its foreign 
policy, particularly for concerns such as human rights.  For these scholars, implementing 
                                                
10 See Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 2004) and Jennifer Welsh, At Home in the World: Canada’s Global Vision for a 21st Century 
(Toronto: HarperCollins, 2004). 
11 Greg Donaghy, “‘A Sad, General Decline?’: The Canadian Diplomat in the 20th Century,” in Canada 
Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 56. 
12 Amnesty International (Canada), “Canada and the International Protection of Human Rights: an Erosion 
of Leadership,” December 2007, 3, http://www.amnesty.ca/themes/resources/hr_agenda_update_2007.pdf. 
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a values-based foreign policy distorts Canada’s understanding of its own interests, 
squanders its international influence, and exposes Canada to charges of hypocrisy.13 
Much of Canada’s rhetoric on human rights is cloaked in the language of altruism 
and morality, suggesting that it is Canada’s responibility or duty to help those in need 
for no other reason than that human rights reflect a fundamental Canadian value.  
However, Canada’s limited appeals to human rights, couched in the rhetoric of values, 
have not produced a policy that adequately consider or sufficiently protects human 
rights.  Thus, it becomes necessary to ask if a foreign policy primarily inspired by 
national interest or a foreign policy motivated by constructivist values and morality is a 
more useful framework for better understanding how and why states promote and protect 
human rights norms.  This question will be explored in the latter half of this thesis using 
the case study of Canadian engagement in Afghanistan to demonstrate that although 
appeals to values may inspire a rhetorical commitment to human rights, there is a causal 
relationship between human rights foreign policy and national interests whereby the 
national interest is realized through a commitment to a human rights foreign policy.   
Human rights are typically considered mutually exclusive from other “harder” 
foreign policy goals, but this thesis aims to demonstrate how human rights can be 
considered a tool to achieving those goals.  It envisions a foreign policy for Canada that 
does not subordinate human rights to security, economic, or other interests because 
foreign policy-makers understand that they are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to 
support each other.  The objective of such an approach is to improve Canada’s ability to 
protect and promote international human rights, leaving little doubt in the minds of the 
                                                
13 Denis Stairs et. al., In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World, (Canadian 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), 13-14. 
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country’s foreign policy-makers that there is undeniable worth and utility in a human 
rights foreign policy and that such a policy will produce national interest ends.  The idea, 
as Julie Mertus puts it, is to compel human rights policy choices by presenting human 
rights not necessarily as the morally correct option, but as the politically correct option.14  
This thesis will take a normative approach towards demonstrating that national 
interests are the most appropriate framework for including human rights in foreign policy.  
In making the case for a “human rights foreign policy,” it will begin by providing a brief 
overview of the place of human rights in Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s national 
interests.  It will then define what is meant by the terms “human rights” and “national 
interest.”  In the discussion of human rights, the ontology of the international human 
rights regime, and specifically the role of morality in human rights, the universality of 
rights, and the relationship between rights and the state will be considered.  In the 
analysis of national interests, realist, constructivist, and English School conceptions will 
be considered.  The debate surrounding values versus interest based foreign policy will 
then be examined and will include a review of the work of key scholars in the field.  
Finally, in an analysis of what a human rights foreign policy might mean for Canada and 
using the benchmarks of greater international legitimacy, increased international 
cooperation, and shared risk/decreased burden, this work will substantiate the theory that 
Canada’s national interests are supported through an effective human rights policy using 
the case study of Afghanistan. 
                                                
14 Julie Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2004), 229. 
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Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Rights  
Canadian Foreign Policy 
An analysis that laments Canada’s dearth of defined foreign policy is far from a 
unique complaint.  When Lester B. Pearson was asked to define Canada’s foreign policy, 
he quipped, “Ask me at the end of the year and when I look back at what Canada has 
done, I’ll tell you what our foreign policy is.”15  Canadian foreign policy refers to the 
objectives of the Canadian government outside its own borders.16  Pragmatism, 
internationalism, multilateralism, and of course, Canada’s relationship with the United 
States, are consistent themes in Canadian foreign policy. In the post-War era, when 
Canada was beginning to assert its status as a middle power, it was the policies of 
Pearson, and his Prime Minister, Louis St-Laurent, that first helped shape the critical 
concepts of Canadian internationalism and multilateralism that are reflected in 
contemporary Canadian foreign policy.   
Internationalism is a fundamental aspect of Canadian foreign policy.17  In contrast 
to isolationism, internationalism suggests that a state is actively involved in world 
affairs18 and incorporates functionalism,19 responsible international engagement, 
multilateralism, and a commitment to international institutions and agreements.  
Associated with discussions of middle powers, the concept became increasingly part of 
                                                
15 Allan Gotlieb, “Romanticism and Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy,” Policy Options 26.2 (2005): 24. 
16 Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall 
Canada, 1997), 7. 
17 Don Munton and Tom Keating, “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 34.3 (2001): 517. 
18 Costas Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 25. 
19 In the post-war era, functionalism, associated with the Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong, became one of 
the central tenets of foreign policy.  According to N ssal, “functionalism asserted that in those areas where 
a smaller state had both interest and expertise…, it should be regarded as a major power and given the rig t 
to be represented on the decision-making bodies in those areas (Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign 
Policy, 54). 
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the Canadian foreign policy lexicon following the Scond World War.  Robert Keohane 
noted that middle power internationalism recognizes that Canada’s capacity limits its 
ability to influence the international sphere, but allows it to still have a significant impact 
through multilateral channels.20  A former colleague of Pearson’s, John Holmes, 
contributed significantly to the discussion, labelling Canadian diplomacy as 
‘middlepowermanship,’ which emphasized his definition of internationalism as “co-
operation of nations in the common interest.”21   
Closely associated with internationalism is the concept of multilateralism, which 
some scholars consider to be the essential characteristi  of Canadian foreign policy.  In 
his recent works, Tom Keating emphasizes the defining role multilateralism has had in 
Canadian foreign policy.22  Alison Brysk considers that it provides Canada with a 
comparative advantage.23  Canadian scholars such as John Ruggie, Keating, Holmes, 
John Kirton, and Nossal have similar conceptions of multilateralism that emphasize, “the 
pursuit of international order and what is good for international society in general.”24  
Canada’s multilateral agenda reflects the limits on Canada’s ability to formulate its own 
foreign policy as a middle power.  Multilateralism represents the best opportunity for 
Canada to realize its goals on the international stage, decrease the burden on Canadian 
resources, and represents the only way to tackle certain transnational problems. 
                                                
20 Robert Keohane, “Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International 
Organization 23.2 (1969): 295. 
21 John Holmes, “The Better Part of Valour” (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), 36. 
22 See, for instance, Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian 
Foreign Policy or Tom Keating, “Update: Canada and the New Multilater lism,” in Readings in Canadian 
Foreign Policy, eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 21-26. 
23 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 67. 
24 Don Munton and Tom Keating, “Internationalism and the Canadian Public,” 530. 
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Generally, Canada much prefers to advocate for multilateral human rights 
agreements rather than pressuring for bilateral negotiations.25  Multilateralism, 
emphasized as a means to achieve Canadian goals rather than an end in and of itself, 
remains a crucial component of Canadian foreign policy.  Although the salience of 
middle power internationalism in Canadian politics is widely debated, there is little doubt 
that these themes have moulded contemporary Canadian foreign policy and have clearly 
affected Canada’s position on human rights.  Even as it must operate within certain 
political, geographic, economic, and domestic constraints, Canada’s global position does 
not necessarily restrict its ability to act.  For instance, several prominent scholars in the 
field emphasize the progressive role that middle powers can have in the promotion and 
protection of human rights, especially in a multilater l setting.26   
Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy 
Geopolitical considerations of the Cold War, a commit ent to non-interference in 
the sovereign affairs of states, and Canada’s domestic considerations, which included 
concerns over federal-provincial constitutional separation of powers, are cited as reasons 
why human rights considerations were largely absent from Canadian foreign policy 
during the early post-War period.  Although Canada signed the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and a Canadian, John Humphreys, was instrumental in its 
                                                
25 Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, “Conclusion: Questions and Prospects,” in Human Rights in 
Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1988), 296. 
26 Baehr and Castermans-Holleman explain that human rights disagreements between major powers can 
foment belligerent tensions, insinuating that there may be a role for middle powers as perhaps a more subtle 
broker (Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 48).  Alison Brysk 
also considers that there is a special role for middle powers.  She notes that if a state is too small, it cannot 
devote sufficient attention to a progressive agenda; if it is too large, it is more interested in reinforcing its 
position at the top (Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 6). 
 9
development, Canada “expressed scepticism about includ g strong human rights 
provisions in the UN Charter.”27   
During the tenure of St-Laurent, who articulated a foreign policy based on 
“human values,”28 Canada embarked upon its first international foreign aid program, 
pledging $25 million to the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in 
South and Southeastern Asia.  St-Laurent’s foreign minister, Lester B. Pearson, won the 
Nobel Peace Prize for his role in solving the Suez Canal Crisis.  This era, in which 
Canada began to exert itself on the international st ge and mould a foreign policy 
bureaucracy with a reputation for excellence and influe ce, is often considered the 
‘Golden Age’ of Canadian diplomacy. 
Under Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker and Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s nascent 
commitment to human rights was displayed through the Canadian Bill of Rights,29 as well 
as Canada’s attempts to become a member of the Human Rights Commission (which it 
did for the first time in 1963), among other developments.  Progressive commitments to 
human rights were integrated into domestic law throughout the 1960s, while Canadians 
such as John Humphreys and Yvon Beaulne contributed to the development of 
international human rights law.  Human rights became increasingly prominent in 
Canadian foreign policy in the late 1960s and 1970s as Canadians became progressively 
more aware of international human rights issues.30   
                                                
27 Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, “Conclusion,” in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, 
294. 
28 Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent at the Gray Lecture, University of Toronto, January 1947, quoted in 
Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism, 6. 
29 Diefenbaker’s 1960 Bill of Rights was the precursor to the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which, 
along with the Canadian Human Rights Act and the provincial and national Human Rights Commissions, 
institutionalizes Canada’s domestic commitment to human rights. 
30 Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making,” in Human Rights in 
Canadian Foreign Policy, 59. 
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It was not until the mid-1970s, however, that Canada began to publicly express an 
overt commitment to human rights principles.  The 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 
increased but inconsistent public attention to human rights of the administration of United 
States President Carter signalled a shift that indicated an elevated international interest in 
human rights.  In 1976, the Trudeau government ratified the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which made Canada 
a party to all six major international human rights conventions, among others.   
Coinciding with this normative shift towards an international human rights agenda 
was a recognition that principles of sovereignty must cease to be considered inviolable.  
Canada gradually conceded that a commitment to human rights meant that how a state 
treated its own citizens could no longer be the concer  solely of that state.  Nossal 
considers that this progression was one of the critical elements that moved Canadian 
governments away from liberal realism and towards idealism, a modification that became 
ingrained in Canadian foreign policy-making and was most immediately evident in Brian 
Mulroney’s relatively vociferous stance on Apartheid in South Africa.31   
During Jean Chrétien’s tenure as Prime Minister andlater under his successor 
Paul Martin, Canadian foreign policy continued to publicly encourage the advancement 
of Canadian values abroad, a policy that has been criticized as sanctimonious,32 Boy 
Scout imperialism,33 and pulpit diplomacy,34 particularly as it concerns Chrétien’s foreign 
minister from 1996-2000, Lloyd Axworthy.  Under Axworthy, Canada led the so-called 
                                                
31 Kim Richard Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On,” 273. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Robin Jeffrey Hay, “Present at the Creation? Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century,” in Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player? eds. Fen Osler Hampson, 
Michael Hart, and Martin Rudner (Toronto: OUP, 2000), 228, quoted in Stairs et. al., In the National 
Interest, 13. 
34 Fen O. Hampson and Dean F. Oliver, “Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy 
Doctrine,” International Journal 53.3 (1998): 379-406. 
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Ottawa Process to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines, encouraged the International 
Criminal Court, and championed the concept of human security.  In 2000, a month before 
Axworthy departed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).  In the shadow of the 11 
September 2001 attacks on the United States, the Commission completed the report The 
Responsibility to Protect, which outlines principles for humanitarian intervntion in the 
context of weakened international norms on state sov reignty. 
As Prime Minister, Paul Martin continued to call attention to human security and 
internationalism.  In the context of increased inter ational interest in the complex 
associations between fragile states and international terrorism, Canada’s 2005 
International Policy Statement (IPS), an extensive foreign policy review, asked 
Canadians to remember that, “Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure, 
more prosperous, more healthy, and more protective of the natural environment.”35  The 
IPS aimed to guide Canada in a post-September 11 nvironment and advocated a “3-D” 
approach to Canadian foreign policy entailing enhanced cooperation between Canadian 
diplomatic, defence, and development circles.36  Jennifer Welsh conveys the ideas 
contained within the IPS when she calls for Canada to be a “model citizen for the twenty-
first century” that advocates for good governance, human rights, and fairness, while 
maintaining its distinctive identity vis-à-vis the United States, and pulling its weight in 
international initiatives.37   
                                                
35 Paul Martin, “Foreword from the Prime Minister: Making a Difference: Canada’s International Policy 
Statement: a Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Diplomacy,” Para 7, 
http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/documents/IPS-EPI/foreword-avant_propos.aspx?lang=eng. 
36 Roger Sarty, “Interplay of Defence and Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations 2008, 138. 
37 Jennifer Welsh, “Canada: Model Citizen for the Twenty-first Century,” in At Home in the World: 
Canada’s Global Vision for the 21st Century (Toronto: HarpersCollins Publishers Ltd., 2004), 187-234. 
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Predictably, the IPS has been “disowned” by current Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper,38 and the concept of 3-D has now been repackaged as Canada’s whole of 
government (WoG) approach in Afghanistan.  Prime Minister Harper has also identified 
human rights as a Canadian value that must be pursued in Canada’s foreign policy.39  For 
instance, early in his tenure in a speech on China’s human rights record, Harper 
contended that “…I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out our values, our beliefs in 
democracy, freedom, and human rights.  They don’t want us to sell out to the almighty 
dollar.”40  Such a moralistic statement proved to upset Canada’s bilateral relationship 
with China to no avail and reflected the often large gulf between rhetoric and action in 
Canadian foreign policy.41  In the presence of consistently drastic budget cuts, the Prime 
Minister has failed to provide DFAIT the necessary resources to develop and execute a 
well-articulated human rights policy.42  Cases such as those of Abousfian Abdelrazik,43 
Omar Khadr,44 or the Afghanistan detainee transfer scandal (discussed in detail in chapter 
                                                
38 Ian Smillie, “Boy Scouts and Fearful Angels: The Evolution of Canada’s International Good Governance 
Agenda,” in Exporting Good Governance: Temptations and Challenges in Canada’s Aid Program, eds. 
Jennifer Welsh and Ngaire Woods (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2007), 64. 
39 John Kirton, “Harper’s “Made in Canada” Global Lead rship,” in Canada Among Nations 2006: 
Minorities and Priorities, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2006), 35, 45. 
40 Speech on November 15, 2006, quoted in Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 74. 
41 Fred Edwards, “Chinese Shadows,” in Canada Among Nations 2008, 310. 
42 DFAIT accounts for the smallest percentage of the fed ral budget and has seen its budget drop by 23.8% 
in the past two years.  Since 2006, DFAIT’s budget has been cut “by nearly $639 million from 2007 leves, 
while at the same time increasing the Defence Department’s budget by more than $2.4 billion.” (Collins, 
Embassy, 18 March 2009). 
43 Abdelrazik is a Canadian who for six years was not permitted to re-enter Canada because he was listed
on a UN terror watch list and was imprisoned and tortured in Sudan.  In 2009, a Federal Court ordered his 
repatriation.  For further information, see Paul Koring, “CSIS to Abdelrazik: ‘Sudan is your Guantanamo’” 
in The Globe and Mail, 23 July 2009, (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/csis-to-abdelrazik-
sudan-is-your-guantanamo/article1228520/).   
44 Khadr is a Canadian who has been detained at Guantan mo Bay since 2002, when he was only 15 years 
old.  He is the only citizen of a western country still held there and the Canadian government refuses to 
repatriate him.  For further information, see Human Rights Watch, “Canada: Harper Should Raise Khadr 
Case During Obama’s Visit,” 17 February 2009, (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/17/canada-harper-
should-raise-khadr-case-during-obamas-visit). 
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three), cast a pall on the Government of Canada’s claim to a commitment to an 
international human rights agenda.   
Canada’s International Human Rights Policy 
Despite the use of a values-based approach, it is fairly well established that there 
is a relationship between Canada’s strategic interes s and Canada’s promotion of human 
rights.45  The DFAIT website claims that human rights is a central theme of Canadian 
foreign policy because it reflects and promotes Canadian values; serves Canada’s 
interests by promoting a stable international system; and because it is a requirement of 
the United Nations Charter and customary internatiol law.46  DFAIT claims that 
“Canada has been a consistently strong voice for the protection of human rights and the 
advancement of democratic values,”47 yet it does not elaborate beyond this sentiment.   
Despite the considerable human rights rhetoric in Canadian foreign policy, 
Canada lacks, at least publicly, a coherent and comprehensive international human rights 
policy.  Indeed, Canada can be considered as having a “‘human rights-blind’ foreign 
policy.”48  This is an ongoing concern; in 1988, Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney 
wrote that because of Canada’s failure to develop a human rights policy, “the role of 
human rights will be ad hoc, sporadic, and highly dependent on individual policy-makers 
and bureaucrats.”49  These comments, along with Pearson’s glib statement regarding the 
post-hoc nature of Canadian foreign policy development, speak to Canada’s failure to 
articulate an adequate political justification for the inclusion of human rights in foreign 
                                                
45 Kim Richard Nossal, “Cabin’d, Cribb’d, Confin’d,” in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, 53. 
46 DFAIT, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy.” 
47 DFAIT, “Canada’s International Human Rights Policy.” 
48 Jean Daudelin, “Introduction: Managing Empires,” in Canada Among Nations 2008, . 
49 Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy-Making,” in Human Rights in 
Canadian Foreign Policy, 60. 
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policy and Canada’s lackadaisical commitment to the protection and promotion of a 
human rights agenda. 
This unfavourable appraisal contradicts the assessmnt  of scholars such as 
Alison Brysk, who concludes in her most recent work that human rights are embedded in 
Canadian foreign policy activities as a result of Canadian identity and cultural values.50  
Constructivist positions such as Brysk’s are reflected in other works on Canadian foreign 
policy that suggest that a state’s foreign policy should represent a state’s most 
fundamental values.51  Accordingly, Canada should include human rights in its foreign 
policy because the promotion and protection of human rights represent a fundamental 
Canadian value. Nossal observes that this was the case under Prime Ministers Jean 
Chrétien and Paul Martin, who, as mentioned, both adopted the mantra that Canada’s 
foreign policy objectives should project Canadian vlues abroad.52   
The constructivist would claim that human rights ought to be included in 
Canadian foreign policy because human rights are rev red as a Canadian value and are 
thus part of the Canadian identity.  Cranford Pratt, who employs the term ‘counter-
consensus’ when describing proponents of a values-based ethical foreign policy,53 rejects 
the suggestion that the primary motivation for a humanitarian foreign policy should be 
                                                
50 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans.  In this work, she considers Canada to be one of six global good 
Samaritans, an exemplary state for its inclusion of human rights in foreign policy. Stressing Canada’s 
rhetorical commitment to human rights, Brysk suggests that Canada has punched above its weight in its 
commitments to multilateral human rights initiatives, human rights jurisprudence and international law,
training and monitoring. 
51 Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, “Introduction,” in Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, 8 
and Bethany Barratt, “Canadian Foreign Policy and International Human Rights,” in Handbook of 
Canadian Foreign, 235. 
52 Kim Richard Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy 40 Years On,” 273. 
53 Cranford Pratt, “Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: the Case of the-Counter 
Consensus” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy, 185. 
 15
anything more than altruistic.54  To do otherwise would mean that Canada had abandoned 
a basic aspect of Canadian values.55  Similarly, Nelson Michaud relies on the rhetoric of 
Lloyd Axworthy to demonstrate that Canadian values are an intrinsic part of the Canadian 
foreign policy process.56  Jennifer Welsh, who is frequently cited in Michaud’s work, 
offers that it is futile to think that Canadian foreign policy-makers can replace a values-
based agenda with an interests-based agenda.  She sugg sts that a collective Canadian 
identity should be considered the starting point of Canadian foreign policy because 
foreign policy is “partly an exercise in forging national identity.”57 
Several distinguished scholars identify identity as a crucial influence on Canada’s 
human rights policy.  Brysk writes that a human rights foreign policy generally reflects a 
nation’s self-identity as a human rights promoter, explaining that interests are conceived 
through the lens of identity and that a distinguishing feature of Canadian identity is its 
“principled internationalism.”58  Many of these scholars suggest that human rights ought 
to be included in Canadian foreign policy because respect for the protection and 
promotion of human rights is a part of Canada’s colle tive identity and “foreign policy is 
an exercise in forging national identity.”59  This circular logic does not even consider 
whether human rights in fact do resonate with Canad s a ‘nation’, a subject that is 
explored in-depth elsewhere, since identity cannot serve as a modicum for the inclusion 
                                                
54 Cranford Pratt, “Competing Rationales for Canadian Development Assistance: Reducing Global Poverty, 
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55 Ibid, 373. 
56 Nelson Michaud, “Values and Canadian Foreign-Policy Making: Inspiration or Hindrance,” in Readings 
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57 Jennifer Welsh “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations 2005: Splitting 
Images, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
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58 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 29-34. 
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of human rights in foreign policy because it represent  the realm of the abstract and 
intangible.  Such vague notions have no place in diplomatic policy.  
Despite the prominence of constructivist discourse in analyses of Canadian 
foreign policy, the constructivist approach to human rights has the inadvertent potential to 
do great damage to the support of a human rights agenda within Canada’s foreign policy. 
Works such as Alison Brysk’s help perpetuate Canadian illusions of national altruism that 
may serve to produce a foreign policy that rhetorically supports human rights but that 
does not act to support human rights in practice and may obscure the facts at hand.  As 
Nossal notes, this was the tendency during the Chrétien and Martin eras,60 causing 
Canadians to become “alarmingly smug, complacent, ad self-deluded” about the 
effectiveness of their foreign policy.61  This is a familiar refrain in Canada, where the 
Pearsonian myth of Canada as a peacekeeper has also been suggested to contribute to a 
nation losing focus of its interests and duping itself about its capacity and influence on 
the international stage.62 
Canada’s National Interest and Human Rights Foreign Policy 
Canada’s foreign policy is meant to allow Canada to realize its national interests.  
Welsh, who sees a need to reinvest in the resources that best support Canada’s interests,63 
also considers that the “pursuit of the national interest requires steps to minimize the 
causes and effects of political and economic instability around the globe.”64  For such 
measured priorities to develop there is a need for strong leadership, sound policy, and 
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conceptual clarity.  There is a tendency in Canada to confuse means designed to achieve 
the national interest, such as multilateralism and internationalism, with ends themselves.  
Too many resources are invested in the process and not enough in the product.  Although 
human rights are usually considered an end, in this work they are considered as a means 
to achieving the national interest.65  This is the key driver behind their inclusion in 
foreign policy; but they are also, of course, a desirable goal outside of the policy sphere.   
Conceptions of Canada’s national interests are sometimes elusive.  David 
Haglund suggests that Canadians are often loathe to even admit to the existence of their 
national interest.66  Canadian conceptions of the national interest usually consider 
elements of security, economy, and prosperity.  George MacLean considers the peace, 
order, and good governance ideals bound in the Canadi  constitution and zeitgeist to 
represent the foundational interest in Canadian foreign policy.67  James Taylor’s 
definition of Canadian national interests includes the maintenance of peace and security, 
prosperity and economic relations, and the promotion of society and culture.68  From a 
more neo-realist perspective, Steven Holloway determines that Canadian national 
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interests are represented by national security, political autonomy, national unity, 
economic prosperity, and principled self-image.69 
In this consideration of Canadian foreign policy, a return to the principles of the 
English School (elaborated on in chapter two) helps to develop a clearer understanding of 
Canada’s national interest.  There is a strong associati n between Canadian foreign policy 
and the English School perspective.  In a 2004 article, Nossal indicates that John Holmes 
could be classified as a proponent of the English Sc ool, recognizing as he did that 
although states exist without the overarching supervision of a supranational government, 
a global community operates as a result of collectiv  respect for international agreements 
and norms.70   
Costas Melakopides’ description of ‘Canadian internationalism,’ characterized by 
a balance of idealism and pragmatism and exemplified by multilateralism in the spirit of 
enlightened self-interest reflects the traditions of the English School.71  Such an 
‘enlightened self-interest’ has become increasingly pertinent in an interconnected and 
interdependent world, as noted by Andrew Thompson, when he writes that, “While 
national interests have determined where and why Canada has focused its efforts, values 
have helped to shape what it is that we are trying to achieve, and perhaps to a lesser 
extent how we wish to achieve it. Call it enlightened self-interest.”72  Alison Brysk notes 
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that norm promotion such as for human rights is most effective when it corresponds with 
enlightened self-interest.73  
Working from these scholars and the middle ground presented by the English 
School, Canadian national interests will be defined as national security, economic 
prosperity, and building a better society.  As per the English School standpoint and its 
focus on order in international society,74 this expression of national interest is not fixed 
but leaves much room to manoeuvre and develop long-term strategies to realize Canadian 
interests.  Thus, national security includes the promotion of peace and security, the 
maintenance of international stability, as well as re pect for territorial and political 
sovereignty.  Economic prosperity includes trade and foreign investment promotion, 
Canadian competitiveness, and innovation.  Finally, building a better society includes 
supporting Hedley Bull’s concept of international society as well as celebrating and 
promoting Canadian culture, Canadian national unity, and nurturing Canadian society.  
Traditional Canadian foreign policy tools of multila eralism and internationalism 
articulated by scholars such as Keating can be interwoven with these interests. 
Measuring national interest is a problematic proposal, particularly because 
national interests are not static and, “The issue is not one of deriving acceptable 
operational measures of major national objectives, but of knowing at which point levels 
of attainment on these objectives engage the national nterest…”75  Not only is it difficult 
to develop indicators to measure national interest, but it is difficult to know if a policy is 
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making positive gains in relation to said interest.  It is short-sighted to view these 
aforementioned indicators of national interest in avacuum, as they are interconnected and 
interdependent on a variety of levels.  Relative gains may lead to the growth of one 
indicator of national interest at the expense of another.  For example, increased national 
security may make Canada a more attractive target for international investment, or 
conversely, increased military spending to increase national security may negatively 
impact economic prosperity.76 
Within the supposedly bipartisan Canadian foreign policy elite, the inclusion of 
human rights in foreign policy will only be legitimzed through expert associations with 
the national interest.  Rather than advocating a bal nce between moral interests and 
national interests, a synthesis of what are in realist terms two dialectic concepts is 
proposed, in which ethical considerations become means to achieve interests-related 
ends.  Implicit in this synthesis are the assumptions that the concept of national interest 
still has contemporary meaning and that universal human rights exist and can be 
considered part of international society. 
To return to the aforementioned components of Canad’s national interest 
(national security, economic prosperity, and building a better society), it is clear that the 
English School focus on the preservation of internatio l order77 through the maintenance 
of an international society can be linked to both national security and economic 
prosperity.  Thus, strengthening international society will be considered Canada’s 
primary national interest.  In order to establish that human rights foreign policy is a 
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condition of Canada’s national interests, it is necessary to demonstrate that Canada’s 
national interests are served by an international human rights policy, which then becomes 
the motivation for including human rights in Canadian foreign policy.  To accomplish 
this, the focus here will be the link between Canada’s international human rights policy 
and the maintenance of international society and international order, which, according to 
the English School, is a critical indicator of the component of the national interest that 
stresses building a better society.   
The mechanism establishing this link is the internation l common interests that 
unite the membership of international society.  Implicit in this is the recognition of the 
impact that a state’s national interest has on other states that are also pursuing their 
national interest.  Common interests among states in international society generate 
international order; “rules, laws, and conventions can, and often do, emerge without an 
overarching authority on the basis of shared interes s.”78 This link will be confirmed by 
demonstrating that the legitimacy of Canadian action increases with a human rights 
foreign policy; Canada’s international collaboration is enhanced; and Canada’s risk or 
burden associated with its international engagement is reduced.  These benchmarks 
correspond to traditional Canadian foreign policy tools of multilateralism and 
internationalism, as well as to the benefits of multilateral cooperation expressed in the 
2005 International Policy Statement.   
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Gauging a Canadian Human Rights Foreign Policy: Legitimacy, 
Cooperation, Risk and Burden 
It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to quantify these subjective 
points of reference.  Indeed, one of the primary reasons why the English School is 
underappreciated outside of European political science circles is its neglect to empirically 
test the validity of some of its main tenets.79  Although qualitative observation of 
empirical data will allow for a clear picture to emrge demonstrating why human rights 
should be considered a tool in Canada’s arsenal, it is challenging to measure these 
notions.  That said, this paper will consider legitimacy through an account of the support 
Canadian action and policy receives; international cooperation will be gauged through 
augmented instances of collaboration, such as in international organizations and 
initiatives with regards to Canada’s human rights policies in Afghanistan; and reduced 
risk and burden will be measured through instances of the assumption of shared 
risk/decreased burden within multilateral relationship  and international initiatives.  A 
cursory example in Afghanistan would be the legitimacy Canada’s mission in 
Afghanistan received through United Nations sanctioing of the mission; an improved 
Canadian relationship with NATO and its members; and the shared risk assumed in 
Afghanistan by stationing troops from a number of like-minded states. 
The three standards developed here – legitimacy, cooperation, shared 
risk/decreased burden - have been developed from the conception of a positive 
international order conducive to building a better society, both internationally and for 
Canada.  These indicators are operationalized throug  the mechanism of common 
interests among states; that is, each indicator contributes to the maintenance of 
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international order (leading to a better society) b reaffirming and strengthening the 
common interests among states or the ties that conne t them.  When a state’s activities 
are perceived as legitimate, it implies that there is a reasonable consensus that the 
activities of the state fall within the realm of acceptable behaviour; when states cooperate, 
they seek and build from common ground; when a state is able to share the burden of its 
actions, the state recognizes that it has common interests with other states and therefore is 
able to reduce risk associated with action. 
 As part of this discussion, power relations and hegemony must be considered.  
Without contemplating existing power structures, a universalist human rights agenda may 
be perceived as “a tool with which to mask the particular national interests of powerful 
countries.”80  Questions surrounding who determines the norms and limits of acceptable 
behaviour, the common interests shared between states, nd who benefits from the 
maintenance of international order must be asked. In his recent work, Ian Clark explores 
the concept of hegemony in the English School, recognizing that insufficient attention has 
been paid to the ways in which hegemony affects the basic tenets of the English School.  
He explains that the English School must conceive of hegemony as an institution of 
international society where the great powers take on the role of managers, but do so with 
the consensus of the other members of international society.81  Hegemony is another 
common institution in which the members of international society have a shared 
investment.  Greater powers require the support of other members; the lesser powers do 
so because they recognize the benefits that can be derived from such a system, and 
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because their voices are still heard on the internaio l stage.  Andrew Hurrell expresses 
this as the great powers belonging to a club in which membership depends on the 
recognition of others.82  Great powers are obligated to responsibly engage with lesser 
powers, because it is ultimately in the best interests of international society. 
Legitimacy is therefore conceived from below, at the level of the lesser powers, 
rather than being imposed from above by the greater powers.  It is bulwarked by 
international cooperation and yields international cooperation.  Risk and burden to 
individual states is reduced through both of these indicators and the incentive to 
cooperate increases.  A triangular set of indictors emerges in which the protection and 
promotion of human rights produces gains at each point in the triangle.  Because of 
Canada’s position in the international system, in the conception of international society 
described here, few countries stand to gain more, or to l se more. 
The Aim of a Human Rights Foreign Policy 
In a consideration of the roles of values and interests in foreign policy, Taylor 
explains that interests are something definable and t gible, making them suitable for the 
diplomatic sphere, while values are not because they ar  ideologically-driven and 
vague.83  Working from this statement, a human rights foreign policy aims to achieve the 
interest of the promotion and protection of international human rights norms through 
“activities by policy makers to influence another state or group of states so that they may 
improve respect for human rights.”84  A human rights foreign policy not only serves to 
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affect those who perpetrate human rights violations but also reinforces the international 
consensus surrounding human rights norms.  The minimal rights that do not leave room 
for extensive debate but that allow individuals not merely to survive but to openly 
participate in their society as healthy and secure members can provide guidance when 
prioritizing which human rights are considered in foreign policy. 
Jack Donnelly and David Forsythe both grapple with the challenges of including 
notions of human rights in foreign policy because foreign policy is traditionally the 
domain of realist expressions of national interest.85  Stanley Hoffmann’s analysis helps 
reconcile what appear to be two contentious concepts in his assessment that, “if a nation 
pursues a human rights policy, it means that it has decided that the protection of those 
rights abroad is in its national interest.”86  This idea will be critical for the remainder of 
this thesis.  In the following section, conceptions of human rights and national interests 
will be further explored, helping to clarify the ideas already presented. 
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2. Definitions and Methodology: Values and Interests in 
Canadian Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy as the promotion of Canadian values abroad instead of Canadian 
interests is certainly nothing new in Canadian politics.  The choice is presented as 
axiomatic: “…the projection of Canadian values rather than the protection of narrow 
foreign policy interests.”87  In recent years, Prime Ministers and Ministers of F reign 
Affairs have made reference to the importance of executing a foreign policy that 
promotes Canadian values abroad.88  However, as mentioned, there is considerable debate 
as to whether Canadian values provide the appropriate foundation and framework for an 
effective Canadian foreign policy.  This is especially true for concepts typically 
associated with a moral imperative, such as human rights.  Although the various schools 
of international relations have invested considerabl  energy examining if or why human 
rights ought to be considered in foreign policy, little of this discussion has been devoted 
to the study of Canada’s international human rights policy.  This thesis aims to begin to 
fill that gap and ultimately demonstrate the utility of executing a foreign policy driven by 
Canada’s national interests.  In this section, the epistemology of human rights and 
national interests will be explored and applied to Canada’s foreign policy and the debate 
surrounding the inclusion of values and interest in foreign policy will be analyzed.   
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Human Rights 
Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt define human rights as, “a justified 
entitlement that any person may claim because of being human and that ought to be 
socially guaranteed.”89 They are the “rights one has simply because one is a human 
being.”90  Human rights are “held universally by all human beings [and] also hold 
‘universally’ against all other persons and institutions,”91 including the state.  Based on 
perceptions of common or shared humanity, the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its accompanying International Covenants on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and on Political and Civil Rights outline the basic rights necessary for 
human dignity.  Henry Shue specifies physical security, subsistence, and liberty 
(including both social participation and physical movement) as those basic rights that are 
necessary for the realization of human dignity.92  In theory, human rights are universal, 
indivisible, inalienable, and interconnected. 
Universality  
It is difficult to avoid charges of cultural imperialism when proposing and 
advancing international human rights standards. Cultural relativists, who represent 
perhaps the most significant challenge to the development of international human rights 
norms, “give priority to the internal judgements of a society.”93  Charges of a western 
liberal bias are levied against those who support the universal application of human 
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rights, and particularly the rights expressed in the United Nations International Covenant 
on Political and Civil Rights.  Cultural relativists claim that moral decisions are 
contingent upon cultural norms rather than any kind of universal minimum standard. 
Appeals to human rights expressed for the purposes f this thesis recognize the 
importance of both cultural standards and traditions, as well as of protecting and 
promoting universal standards of human rights.  Donnelly’s concept of weak cultural 
relativism or strong (not absolute) universalism is employed to emphasize that although 
there is a minimum standard of human rights, there is room for cultural divergence in 
implementation and interpretation.  As Donnelly’s analysis stresses, most rights are not 
limitless, using the example of debates surrounding pornography as a limit on the right to 
freedom of speech. 94  It is critical to apply human rights norms in a context-specific 
analysis that will allow for the prioritization of certain rights in a culturally sensitive 
manner that reflects an awareness of cultural or regional approaches.95  In his work on 
cultural legitimacy, Abdullahi An Na’im considers that international human rights 
standards must be developed through “internal dialogue” and the “enlightened 
perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms.”96  Not only are there 
different interpretations of rights between cultures and regions, but also inter-culturally.  
Human rights do not need to be applied in a rigidly uniform fashion.97   
These basic rights have been described by several scholars in the field.  Donnelly 
describes an international “overlapping consensus” regarding the most basic requirements 
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for human dignity.98  Along similar lines, Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans-
Holleman emphasize principle rights compared to ‘other’ rights as those rights necessary 
for a dignified human existence, although these arguments do not address debates 
concerning the definition of human dignity.  John Vincent and Shue use a reduced 
conception of basic rights; Vincent explicitly cites Shue’s notion of basic rights as those 
rights necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights: life, liberty, and sustenance.99  The 
agreement between these two scholars is noted by Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler in 
their consideration that all individuals have certain rights, “because they share the same 
essential human nature.”100   
This thesis accepts the view that there is indeed a minimum universal consensus 
on certain basic rights but also acknowledges the importance of context-specific and 
culturally sensitive interpretations of those rights.  Those basic rights described here 
search for a balance between the abstract appeals to human dignity expressed by 
Donnelly and Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, and the survivalist rights expressed by 
Shue and Vincent.  Thus, this thesis considers the kind of minimal rights that may leave 
room for some debate but will nevertheless allow individuals not merely to survive but to 
participate openly in their society as healthy and secure members.  This list includes but 
is not limited to the right to life, freedom of association, freedom from violence and 
abuse, juridical fairness, the right to sustenance, th  ability to participate in the public 
sphere, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, and degrading treatment. 
                                                
98 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 40. 
99 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 125. 
100 Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Introduction: Human Rights and the Fifty Years’ Crisis,” in 
Human Rights and Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 5. 
 30
The Moral Ontology of Human Rights 
The rich debate on the ontology of rights springs from the natural rights 
arguments of Ancient Greek thinkers.  Suggestions such as those of Donnelly, who 
claims that human rights are derived from the moral nature of humanity,101 are echoed by 
scholars such as Forsythe, who considers rights as a moral attribute that the state cannot 
contravene. 102  In addition to being founded in a moral obligation that is common to all 
of humanity, Matthews and Pratt emphasize that human rights are claims that “generate 
moral obligations”103 and that “Canada has a moral obligation to attach a high priority to 
help consolidate international acceptance of [human] rights.”104  According to this 
outlook, the promotion of human rights can only be fu lled by ethical motivations, which 
are the only way to increase support for human rights initiatives.105   
Both Donnelly and Forsythe add qualifications to their morally-based convictions.  
Donnelly notes that “human rights should not be confused with the values and aspirations 
underlying it…”106 and Forsythe explains that it becomes difficult to sustain the inclusion 
of human rights in foreign policy when only moral and altruistic arguments are made to 
support their incorporation.  In a vein similar to Donnelly, he explains that if human 
rights could be linked to self-interest, it would become possible to develop a political 
response to a human rights violation.107  In a statement that provides foundation for this 
thesis, Forsythe reminds Donnelly that “the inescapable fact is that by referring to human 
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rights as moral rights, one puts the basic concept in the realm of the controversial and 
intractable discourse.”108  In addition to Shue’s moral grounding, he also claims that 
institutionalizing rights requires “means/ends, instrumental, or strategic reasoning.”109  
These scholars seem to recognize that although human rights may indeed reside in the 
realm of moral discourse, morality or values do notprovide sufficient motivation for 
states to include them in their policy processes. 
It is critical for a consideration of a human rights foreign policy to position human 
rights outside of a moral boundary because states do not operate in the moral realm.  
Morality in the context of the state system, as Machi velli reminds us, is not morality in 
the context of the individual.  The influence of Machiavelli is evident in Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s famous 1932 conviction that moral humankind operates in an immoral 
world.110  This statement remains applicable because, although the representatives of the 
state may be moral agents, the state itself is not a moral agent.  At best, the state can be 
considered amoral.111 
Joseph Nye, Jr. considers that moral values are intangible interests,112 but in terms 
of developing foreign policy to be executed in an anarchic and immoral international 
sphere, morality cannot be part of the determinatios f the state.  Hoffmann explains that 
it is the duty of a representative of the state to act in the interests of the nation, which may 
require immoral actions;113  however, he also expresses that the challenge is to bring 
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interests and morality together.114  Morality and interests can be compatible, but in terms 
of developing foreign policy to be executed in an amoral (if not immoral) world, 
moralistic or value-based appeals to include human rights in foreign policy are best saved 
for the rhetoric of partisan politics.  Based on these assessments, considerations of human 
rights as a moral obligation or duty will be supplanted by the assumption that the 
protection and promotion of human rights is necessary because they can be demonstrably 
beneficial to the state. 
The Relationship between Rights and the State 
Human rights are also legal rights protected by state laws and statutes.  Political 
legitimacy is derived from the status of human rights as legal rights.115  As the 
international consensus surrounding the idea of human rights developed, the United 
Nations Security Council began to define human rights violations as a possible threat to 
international peace and security, thereby extending the scope of and responsibility for 
rights.  Most states now accept that human rights are a concern of all states.116  Rights 
require that the state stop or refrain from doing certain things and provide certain 
things,117 both inside their own borders and also internationlly.  Additionally, although 
the focus here is the state, it is important to recall that non-state actors such as the private 
sector, non-governmental organizations, and internaio l institutions are expected to 
promote and protect human rights. 
Most of the literature on the relationship between the state and human rights 
focuses on the duties which the state is responsible for providing to its citizens.  Shue 
                                                
114 Ibid, 41. 
115 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 11-12. 
116 Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 2. 
117 Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders, 101. 
 33
coined the term ‘service duties’ to mean those duties that a government bears on behalf of 
its constituents as their agent.118  According to Shue, the state is obligated to avoid 
depriving, to protect from depravation, and to aid the deprived.119  This perception is 
reflected in a 2006 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights document 
that considers that the state, as a duty bearer, is obligated to respect, protect, and fulfil its 
human rights obligations.120  Matthews and Pratt apply this argument to the Canadian 
context when they claim that Canada has duties to protect the rights of those outside 
Canada’s borders.121  Although these assessments may be accurate, a duty is something 
that ought to be done; the goal of this thesis is to make a case for the removal of the 
“ought to’s” and the “musts” from human rights discourse and instead to present actors 
with a clear motivation to promote and protect human rights: it is in their best interests.  
The state has definite responsibilities that correspond to human rights but these are 
specific actions that correlate with the state’s interests.   
Using both punishment and reward, there is a range of activities a state can 
undertake to protect and promote human rights including diplomatic, economic, and 
military actions.  Diplomatic activities include monitoring and standard-setting, quiet 
diplomacy such as demarches and meetings, public statements or shaming, cancellation 
or postponement of visits, legal means such as complaint procedures, breaking contacts in 
the fields of sports and culture, ending diplomatic relations, and rewarding good 
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behaviour through positive assistance or invitations.  Economic activities include 
sanctions or trade embargoes, rewards of increased trade or development assistance, or 
support to civil society groups in order to circumvent a human rights violating 
government.  The use of force is an additional option, but a discussion of military 
responses to human rights violations raises a host of other debates concerning 
humanitarian intervention and sovereignty that are outside the scope of this work.  If 
human rights are considered a national interest, there are difficult moral questions 
associated with using force to defence them.122  This certainly requires further research.  
National Interests 
National interest is a contested concept, interpreted and implemented differently 
by adherents to the various theories of internationl relations. It is considered the 
legitimate articulation of the needs of a community and includes several assumptions; 
namely that members of a society share some common interests, that certain national 
interests are permanent and transcend political partisanship, and that the government is 
the legitimate agent charged with interpreting and rticulating the national interest.123  
The national interest can be thought of as an “analytic  tool for describing, explaining, 
and assessing the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy.” 124 
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Realism and National Interests 
Realists claim that they attempt to consider the int rnational system as it is, not 
how it ideally might be, and they therefore focus on the survival of the state in an 
anarchic world system.  This is generally associated with the Machiavellian concept of 
raison d’état, in which the state official places the priorities and goals related to the 
survival of the state above all other objectives.  Hans Morgenthau, an archetypal classical 
realist, held that the national interest is an objectiv  and fixed concept that can be defined 
by power.125 Kenneth Waltz describes national interest in terms of tate survival in a 
competitive struggle between nations in a zero sum ga e, whereby the national interest is 
obvious and identical for every state.126  Stephen Krasner writes that the national interest 
must be “related to general societal goals, must persist over time, and must have a 
consistent ranking of importance...”127  Each of these scholars considers national interest 
to be an objective and straightforward concept thatrepresents the overall goals that the 
members of a state share. These long-term common objectives seek only to augment the 
ability of the state to survive and discount a cosmpolitan ethic that might include 
appeals to human rights.  
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Constructivism and National Interests 
Constructivism rejects the realist assertion that te national interest is fixed and 
objective.128  It suggests that national interests are socially constructed by the dominant 
members of a group and are developed, learned, and relearned as the values, ideas, and 
beliefs of a society change. For instance, Cranford Pratt proposes that Canadian interests 
are shaped by national elites to the exclusion of alternative views.129  James Rosenau, 
who introduced the idea of identifying national interest through either objective or 
subjective definitions, claims that “national interest is rooted in values (“what is 
best”).”130  This interpretation suggests that there is nothing tangible or empirical about 
national interest.  
National interests are also considered flexible and malleable, partially because, as 
Martha Finnemore puts forward, state preferences change through interaction in the 
international social system.131  The national interest is a reflection of the identity of the 
people of that nation and has a distinctive moral fl vour. Brysk perceives that states 
develop their national interests based on their self-id ntity.  She sees national interest, and 
specifically principled national interests as delibrately developed and constructed via the 
political process within a society.132  Identity, as well as the influences and factors that 
shape identity over time, is a critical concept in this interpretation.  Alexander Wendt 
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emphasizes this subjective and nebulous characterization of national interest when he 
includes collective self-esteem in his considerations.133 
The English School and National Interests 
Common critiques to these perspectives highlight the failure of realism to account 
for international cooperation and post-Cold War security challenges or cite flimsy 
constructivist notions of identity and hollow appeals to moral values. The English School 
can be considered a middle ground between realist and constructivist conceptions of 
national interest, whereby the national interest becomes the preservation of the 
international order. The English School extends Rousseau’s description of the general 
will, or the common political expression within a society, to include an international 
society.134   
Shades of both realist and more cosmopolitan perspectives are reflected in the 
English School concept of national interest, but instead of realist state survival in an 
anarchic world or constructivist identity in an interconnected world, the English School 
focuses on the preservation of international society and the common interests between 
states.  The foremost common interest is the preservation of international order; others 
include the development of an environment conducive to positive trade, the protection of 
the ability of members of society to contribute to that society, and the establishment of 
non-violent conflict resolution.  Like realism, adherents to the English School accept that 
there is a balance of power in international relations, but they also accept that all states 
will benefit from the establishment of rules and conventions within the international 
diplomatic system that limit the behaviour of states.  However, as Barry Buzan points out, 
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inherent within the English School’s concepts of inter ational society are strains of 
constructivism such that international society is about the evolution of shared norms, 
rules, and institutions within a group.135 
Proponents of the English School advocate an enlightened self-interest that 
suggests that states must recognize the interests of o her states and the utilitarianism of an 
international society in which order is preserved through respect for rules and 
conventions that place limits on states’ behaviour.136  Hedley Bull focuses on this idea of 
an international society and enlightened-self interest in which being a good global citizen 
becomes an a priori aspect of the national interest.137  States reconfigure traditional 
notions of national interest to recognize the interests of other states, and the impact their 
actions have on other states, regional stability, and international order.138 
ENGLISH SCHOOL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Bull was associated with the Grotian or internationalist tradition of the English 
School in that he believed that states are limited in their conflicts with one another by 
common interests, rules, and institutions.139  Bull did not conceive human rights to be 
among these common interests, and actually wrote that universal human rights could be a 
threat to world order because conflict between state  could emerge from the failure to 
achieve an international consensus on human rights.140  He could not envision a human 
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rights code that existed objectively or independently of particular states’ attitudes and 
principles.141 
Bull’s pessimism was not shared by more solidarist142 English School theorists, 
who aimed to include the individual, as well as the state, in their conception of 
international society.  Vincent considered that Bull was misguided in his fear that states 
would be undermined by a human rights agenda, instead expressing how states could be 
strengthened by universal human rights standards.  A  he remarks in one of his best-
known works, Vincent “hoped to make inroads on Bull’s cheerful scepticism on human 
rights.”143  Vincent puts forth a convincing argument outlining how the development of 
universal human rights norms could serve to benefit both the state and international 
society. 144  Although he recognizes that there is an “inescapable tension between human 
rights and foreign policy,” he also considers that a human rights foreign policy becomes 
part of the national interest of the state because of its importance to securing and 
nourishing citizens.145  Bringing to mind constructivist language, Vincent considers that 
human rights have evolved to add to the legitimacy of the international society, thereby 
strengthening and consolidating both the system and the state.146   
If for English School theorists the task is to maint i  international order by 
establishing and reinforcing common interests, human rights become an opportunity to 
broaden and extend areas of consensus.  Only focusing on fostering international peace 
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and order does not necessarily advance individual hman rights.  Dunne points out that 
progressive English School theorists recognize the link between human rights protection 
and promotion and international society.147  The well-being of individuals as the primary 
actors in international society becomes paramount to he well-being of states.  In 
international society, conflict is more easily avoided, rights are respected, and there is 
further incentive to uphold international agreements because states recognize that it is in 
their best interests to contribute to international order. As part of this, human rights, 
justice, and international law are essential to the maintenance of an international order 
that is in turn required for the survival and prosperity of the state.148  Furthermore, 
implicit in the English School is not only the realist assumption of shared and objective 
common interests within a society, but also a recognition that there are certain human 
interests that are shared internationally, regardless of state frontiers. To reiterate, human 
rights are pursued because of their contribution to the preservation of a legitimate 
international order.149 
Coined by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, the term ‘good 
international citizenship’ recognizes that national interest and human rights do not need 
to be mutually exclusive, but also dismisses utopian appeals to shared morality.150  
Canada, like Australia, is a middle power with limited military capacity, and therefore 
has “a long-term security interest in promoting rule-governed international order.”151  
Multilateral cooperation and international monitoring become part of “another viewpoint 
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which argues for a mutual interdependence between the provision of national security, the 
strengthening of international order, and the promotion of human rights.”152  Middle 
powers such as Canada can benefit from a concept that promotes cooperation through 
adherence to common interests and respect for international order.  Human rights become 
a tool to achieve this.  Good governance at home and abroad translates into respect for 
human rights, and human rights become a tool to achieve long-term national interests.  
The English School, and especially the solidarist strain of the School, provides the 
necessary theoretical foundations within which to base this principle.   
The Debate: Values versus Interests in a Human Rights Foreign Policy 
For the conventional realist, human rights have no real place in foreign policy and 
are subordinate to other components of the national interest.  In an anarchical world 
system, the realist is only concerned with the augmentation of the state’s power; to act 
otherwise would leave the state vulnerable to the ambitions of other states.  Morgenthau 
explains the realist’s rejection of human rights, expr ssing, “the principle of the defense 
of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must 
come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of 
human rights in a particular circumstance.”153  The realist considers that amorality or 
immorality is sometimes a requisite of international relations and judges it dangerous to 
elevate human rights to the same level as other forign policy interests.154  Human rights, 
if not a folly, are generally thought to be too idealistic and too utopian to be considered 
part of the unregulated and unrestrained internatiol system.   
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The constructivist conception of human rights in foreign policy is much more 
nuanced than that of the realists.  The constructivist school proposes that human rights 
have evolved into a social fact that exists because of human agreement and that the 
actions of a state are strongly influenced by human rights norms and ideas.155  Donnelly 
suggests that one of the primary reasons that human rights are included in a state’s 
foreign policy is that human rights are considered part of that state’s national identity.156  
Donnelly considers that moral interests such as human rights are no more outlandish than 
traditional interests of foreign policy such as economic and security interests.157  For 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, human rights ave been institutionalized as a 
norm within international relations; human rights are considered as part of foreign policy 
because it no longer is acceptable not to consider them.158  For constructivists, human 
rights ought to be considered within foreign policy because human rights have evolved to 
become an intrinsic aspect of a functional society.  Human rights are perceived to be a 
value and should therefore be part of the internatio l self-expression of the state. 
Scholars such as Welsh, Donnelly, and Pratt who advocate for a values-based 
foreign policy concede that pragmatism and values can converge. Evoking the English 
School, Welsh writes that changes in the internatiol system have necessitated a 
broadening of national interests that includes recognizing that countries now share 
interests more than ever before.159  Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for 
such a reconceptualization of national interests when e wrote in 1999 that, “a new 
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broader definition of national interest is needed in the new century, which would induce 
states to find greater utility in the pursuit of common goals and values.”160 
An amalgam of national interests and values in which uman rights is considered 
to be a tool towards national interest goals is precisely what William Schulz of Amnesty 
International USA advocates when he stresses that “defending human rights is a 
prerequisite to protecting that interest.”161  Schulz goes on to call for a “more expansive, 
sophisticated, comprehensive form of [realism] – a new realism.”162  William Thornton 
claims that a “new moral realism” is emerging that recognizes the benefits of correlating 
domestic moral values with foreign policy and of seeking stability and development 
through the promotion of human rights.163  Forsythe explains that if human rights could 
be linked to self-interest, or if human rights do not interfere with self interest, it becomes 
possible to build a political response to a human rights violation.164  Similarly to Nossal, 
he laments the flimsy politics behind strong international human rights rhetoric.165   
What is lacking in most analyses of human rights foreign policy is a certain 
amount of political imagination. Such imagination could envision a foreign policy that 
does not subordinate human rights to security, economic, or other interests because 
policy-makers understand that they are mutually inclusive concepts that serve to support 
each other. Forsythe, who describes himself as a “pragmatic liberal,”166 touches on this 
when he expresses what he considers to be the “fundamental challenge” of reconciling a 
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liberal international human rights framework with the realist principles typically found in 
a state’s foreign policy that deem human rights in foreign policy to be quixotic.167  
Framing human rights as moral obligation or political value within foreign policy, as 
constructivists tend to, marginalizes and devalues th  potential of a state’s international 
human rights policy.  
Schulz’s appeal for a ‘new realism’ relates to the work of Micheline Ishay, a 
colleague of Donnelly’s.  She suggests that commitments to human rights ought to be 
considered critical in any long-term security strategy. National security and human rights 
are not mutually exclusive; rather, human rights and other forms of global justice 
represent the only way towards achieving national security.168  Human rights, 
traditionally considered by realists to be marginal, become critical to advancing national 
interest. Ishay proposes a modern “new realist human rights agenda” that,  
recogniz[es] the legitimacy of core national security 
concerns, seize[s] human rights opportunities amid great 
power politics, reevaluat[es] the appropriate means towards 
human rights ends, reassess[es] the limit to imposing human 
rights from outside, and confront[s] the overall need for a 
new human rights realism in our globalized economy.169  
It is the responsibility of the advocates for interational human rights to frame issues that 
it may consider ethical within the prism of realpolitik and offer innovative 
recommendations for ensuring that a human rights agenda within foreign policy is viable. 
Although unintended, Ishay’s proposal is a fitting response to Ian Smillie, who expresses 
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concern that while human rights have become increasingly prominent within government 
rhetoric, their application has become limited by realpolitik.170   
Thus, a nexus emerges between Eayrs’ early Canadian pr ctical idealism, 
Forsythe’s pragmatic liberalism, Nossal’s liberal realism, and Ishay’s new realist human 
rights agenda in which a new approach rooted in the rationalist principles of the English 
School towards the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy becomes clear. Separating 
human rights from morality and advancing an interests-based approach to human rights in 
foreign policy entrenches human rights within foreign policy norms. The removal of 
quixotic references to human rights in foreign policy and the development of a new 
emphasis on a national interests-foreign policy framework present an opportunity for the 
human rights community to better promote and protect human rights. Although morality-
based approaches can motivate and inspire, advancing interest-based approaches 
supported by appropriate resources can produce results. The example of Canadian 
engagement in Afghanistan will demonstrate that Canadian human rights policy is more 
likely to be successful in cases in which it is motivated primarily by national interests and 
that a universal human rights agenda can advance Canadian national interests.  
It is undeniable that “human rights will occupy a central role only if the molders 
of foreign policy are persuaded that a focus on human rights goals advances our national 
interest.”171  Although a limited sample is used here, the case study of Afghanistan will 
demonstrate that there is much merit to the suggestion that the robustness of human rights 
policy within Canada’s foreign policy is correlated to national interest. Thus, when 
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human rights are framed within the context of national interests they become vital to the 
foreign policy-maker and central within foreign policy discourse.  
The promotion and protection of human rights in foreign policy advances national 
interests by allowing a state to be relevant and influe tial within global human rights 
discourse; to further security interests by promoting nternational order, peace, and 
stability; to enforce a just world order in which international cooperation based on shared 
aspirations occurs; and to garner the support of a state’s citizenry.172  New bilateral and 
multilateral relationships are forged.  The promotion of human rights abroad could 
generate further common bonds within Canada as Canadians collectively support and 
rally behind Canada’s international actions, as well as internationally through new 
partnerships.  Thus, with the necessary political imagination, Canada’s national interests 
as defined above are reflected via the protection and promotion of human rights within 
Canadian foreign policy, whereby policy-makers understand that traditional foreign 
policy interests are not subordinate to human rights interests but instead they are mutually 
inclusive concepts that serve to support each other.  
                                                
172 Ibid. 
 47
3. A Case Study: Human Rights and Canada’s Engagement in 
Afghanistan 
This chapter will apply the concept of a human rights foreign policy grounded in 
the principles of the English School to Canada’s participation in the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan, in order to make the case for a human rights approach to Canadian foreign 
policy.173  The objective here is to demonstrate how the kindof human rights approach 
described in the last chapter could help Canada achieve its national interest ends.  To do 
so, this section will begin by providing an overview of Canada’s engagement in 
Afghanistan, exploring what Canada hopes to accomplish there and how Canada intends 
to realize its goals.  It will then ask how human rights have factored into the mission, 
paying particular attention to the ways in which human rights have been institutionalized 
in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and emphasizing the 
prioritization of those human rights that are most important to Afghans.  Finally, this 
thesis will demonstrate how a human rights approach could help Canada achieve its 
objectives in Afghanistan; first by looking at Canada’s specific priorities there and 
continuing to examine Canada’s objectives in the NATO mission, as one of 42 
participants.  In the final section, the benchmarks of legitimacy, cooperation, and shared 
risk/decreased burden will be applied to demonstrate that a human rights approach can 
benefit international order, international society, and Canada’s national interest.  The aim 
                                                
173 NATO is in Afghanistan to “assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and
influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance.” “It does thi
predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is assisting 
the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability and creating the conditions for reconstruction and 
development.” (NATO, NATO’s Role in Afghanistan, 
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here is to set the bar high to provide a coherent and logical framework for including 
human rights in foreign policy. 
Overview of Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan 
Canada’s participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan represents Canada’s 
largest and costliest foreign policy priority.  Canada has invested billions of dollars, 
thousands of soldiers, and the attention of several government departments.  It is 
Canada’s largest military undertaking since the Korean War and represents the chief 
recipient of Canadian official development assistance.  The mission began as a defensive 
mission against a perceived international threat bunow includes humanitarian 
justifications, leading to ambiguous rationalizations for Canada’s engagement.  Described 
in the first quarterly progress report tabled to Canada’s Parliament in June 2008, the 
“ultimate aim [of the mission] is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans in a viable country that 
is better governed, more peaceful, and more secure.” 174  According to the same report, 
Canada is also “helping to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a base for 
terrorism directed at North America.”175 
Although Canada’s approach to Afghanistan lacks an overarching vision and there 
remains considerable ambiguity concerning its goals, six priorities have been developed 
for Canada’s engagement.  For the period of 2008 to 2011, when Canada is scheduled to 
withdraw its troops, the priorities are as follows, 
1) enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in Kandahar to sustain a 
safer environment and promote law and order;  
2) strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver basic services;  
                                                
174 Canada, “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011,” (First Quarterly Report) 
June 2008.  Released on 10 June 2008, 3.  http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-
afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghrep_en.pdf. 
175 Ibid, i. 
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3) provide humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable people;  
4) enhance border security with facilitation of Afghan-Pakistani dialogue;  
5) help advance Afghanistan’s democratic governance; 
6) facilitate Afghan-led political reconciliation…176 
These priorities were developed to conflate with the Afghanistan Compact, which 
attempts to provide a strategic framework by identifyi g 1) security; 2) governance, rule 
of law and human rights; and 3) economic and social development, as three critical and 
interdependent areas of focus for activity until 2011.  The first four priorities relate to the 
Kandahar region where the vast majority of Canada’s military personnel are stationed, 
while the last two relate to all of Afghanistan.   
Coinciding with the six priorities, Canada has also committed to three so-called 
signature projects.  The first project involves repairing the Dahla Dam, which would 
provide a critical irrigation system for the Kandahar region.  Canada has pledged 
approximately $50 million to this project; however, the work seems to be progressing 
more slowly than anticipated.177  For the second project, Canada has committed 
approximately $12 million to building fifty schools in Kandahar Province and assisting to 
build the capacity of the Ministry of Education.  As of June 2009, Canada had completed 
five schools and 25 more were underway.  Despite Canad ’s efforts, reports suggest that 
insecurity and threats in the south of Afghanistan h ve forced the Ministry of Education 
                                                
176 Canada. “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament,” (Fourth Quarterly Report) 
March 2009.  Released on 3 June 2009, 4.  http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-
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177 Colin Perkel (CP), “Canada’s $50M Dahla Dam Project in Afghanistan Shows Few Signs of Life,” 
Guelph Mercury, 29 May 2009, http://news.guelphmercury.com/Wire/News_Wire/World/article/487944. 
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to close up to six hundred schools, affecting 300,0 students.178  The third project aims 
to eradicate polio across Afghanistan by 2009, which entails an investment of $60 
million.  This goal seems increasingly unattainable as five new cases of polio were 
reported in the fourth quarterly report, in addition t  the 31 new cases reported in 2008. 
Canada’s priorities frame the activities of the Afghanistan Task Force, situated in 
the Privy Council Office, which develops Canada’s Afghanistan policies and works 
towards an integrated approach to Afghanistan.  It also supports the work of the Cabinet 
Committee on Afghanistan, which considers diplomatic, defence, development and 
security issues related to Afghanistan.179  These groups are shored up by personnel at the 
Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT), and the Canadian Interational Development Agency 
(CIDA).  This work is complemented by Standing Committees in both the House of 
Commons and the Senate, as well as by a Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in 
Afghanistan.  These organizations and committees ar meant to be illustrative of a 
coordinated, integrated, WoG approach, as advocated by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).180 
Each department involved in Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan has its own 
focus, though it is sometimes difficult to ascertain which department is responsible for 
what.  DFAIT, where the Afghanistan Task Force was originally housed, is responsible 
for maintaining Canada’s embassy in Kabul and other offices in Kandahar.  Canada 
                                                
178 Canadian Council for International Cooperation, “Aid in the Crosshairs: Civil-Military Relations in 
Afghanistan,” CCIC Briefing Note, April 2009,” 4. 
179 The Committee includes the Ministers of International Trade, International Cooperation, National 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Public Safety. 
180 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Whole of Government Approaches to 
Fragile States,” 2006, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf. 
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opened its embassy in 2003, where it hosted “energetic and influential counsel to the 
highest levels of the Afghan government.”181 There is much evidence to suggest that the 
current Canadian government prioritizes defence over diplomacy for politically-
motivated reasons, none more obvious than recent budgetary numbers.  What this means 
for Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is certainly an area for further exploration.182 
The size of DND’s budget corresponds with the size of the military venture in 
Afghanistan.  The Canadian Forces operate as part of Operation Athena in which the 
Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-Afg) conducts operations.  Approximately 2,800 
Canadian personnel are stationed in Kabul and Kandahar Province, most of whom are 
deployed in the south.  Task Force Kandahar includes a Battle Group that conducts 
counterinsurgency and other security operations; soldiers and military police of the 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), which assists the Afghan National Army 
(ANA); and the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT).  The K-PRT, for 
which Canada has been responsible since 2005, includes 330 experts in diplomacy, 
corrections, development, policing, and the military.  It supports key projects such as 
police training and strengthening local governing capacity.183 
CIDA contributes to development projects that support basic services such as 
education and economic growth, humanitarian assistance, and national institutions.  The 
most recent information posted on the CIDA website notes that it spent approximately 
$280 million in the fiscal year of 2007-2008, making Afghanistan Canada’s largest 
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bilateral donor recipient.184  Programs such as the Kandahar Local Initiatives Program, 
which works on small-scale local priority projects, and the National Solidarity Program, 
which is the Government of Afghanistan’s flagship program for community development, 
are part of CIDA’s contributions. 
In June 2009, the Government of Canada tabled its fourth quarterly report to 
Parliament, in which it analyzed progress in the six aforementioned priorities.  This report 
conveys some positive developments in the areas of the training and infrastructure 
projects within the justice sector (p. 17), the capacity of the regional hospital in Kandahar 
(p. 22), and progress towards voter registration goals (p. 26).  However, it also notes that 
the security situation continues to decline, resulting in higher levels of violence than any 
other winter quarter (p. 2).  Not only is the security situation continually degenerating, 
people in the Kandahar region where most Canadians are stationed feel more insecure, 
further undermining the international mission and the legitimacy of the Afghan 
government (p. 3).  Political reconciliation in Afghanistan still appears to be fantasy 
(p.11), while government capacity to deliver development programs declined (p. 26).   
Beyond the areas in which Canada has not achieved its benchmarks, there are also 
considerable concerns associated with the WoG approch that guides Canada’s actions in 
Afghanistan.  Afghanistan represents the first opportunity for the implementation of this 
type of WoG approach, which originated with the American military concept of a three-
block-war that simultaneously involves combat, diplomacy, and development in an 
overall effort to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population.  Concurrent with OECD-
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) “Principles for Good International 
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Engagement in Fragile States and Situations” and the areas of activity of the Afghanistan 
Compact, Canada aims to implement the kind of comprehensive strategies to state failure 
inspired by the three-block war concept that involve not only DND, DFAIT, and CIDA, 
but also other government departments, such as Canada Border Services Agency and the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as non-governm ntal organizations, private 
actors, diaspora communities, and academics.  This integrated approach recognizes that 
violence, poverty, political instability, and conflict affect and feed off each other and 
cannot be considered in isolation.   
However, there has been a distinct failure to develop a coherent approach to 
Afghanistan.  The best demonstration of this is the lack of cooperation between the 
Canadian military and civilians with regards to balancing development and security.  The 
tension between military and civilian objectives is a result of unclear overall objectives 
for Canada, confusing public sentiment on the part of the government, and contradictory 
interpretations of priorities among Canadian actors.  Such confusion has been made 
worse by the deteriorating security situation and the inability of development workers to 
safely and effectively deliver humanitarian assistance, which raises questions about the 
tensions between security and the realization of basic rights.  With the worsening security 
situation and the large percentage of funding that e military receives, there is concern 
that Canada’s participation in the mission is becoming ‘one big D’ – defence.  In these 
circumstances, human rights are marginalized becaus they are considered mutually 
exclusive from other pressing needs, which limits their utility in Afghanistan. 
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The Role of Human Rights in Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan 
Within this quagmire, where little progress has been observed and the chances of 
success are becoming more remote, a human rights approach to Canadian policy in 
Afghanistan offers the opportunity more readily to realize Canadian goals in the region, 
as well as to assist Afghans in achieving a domestic human rights culture that respects, 
promotes, and protects human rights.  Such an approch would integrate human rights 
discourse into policy considerations as a tool within a broad arsenal.  Using the 
universalist foundations of human rights already discussed, such an approach could 
highlight the shared interests between Afghanistan and the other states engaged in the 
region, as well as strengthen the international consensus on human rights.  An 
examination of the way human rights have been institutionalized in Afghanistan, the 
human rights situation on the ground, and the perspective of human rights held by 
ordinary Afghans must be considered prior to an analysis of how a human rights 
approach might benefit Afghanistan.  Using this background, the way in which a human 
rights approach in Afghanistan might help achieve Canada’s goals will be considered in 
the following sections. 
Institutionalization of Human Rights in Afghanistan 
Although international human rights are institutionalized in Afghan law, they are 
not necessarily applied or implemented at the societal l vel. Human rights objectives 
have been included in the rebuilding of Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime. 
They were included in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 between international 
representatives and Afghan leaders, which attempted to establish the foundations for a 
post-Taliban Afghanistan and specifically requires the Afghan government to respect 
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human rights.  Rights are also institutionalized through international human rights 
agreements, the 2003 Afghanistan Constitution, the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, and the 2008 Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy.  
Afghanistan has ratified the International Covenants on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Conventions on the Rights 
of the Child, the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women, the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, against Torture, and the two Optional Protocols of 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child.  Yet their fficacy is limited and, as 
Afghanistan recognized in the most recent round of UN Human Rights Council Universal 
Periodic Review, reporting mechanisms have been sporadic and in most cases, have not 
occurred in years, if not decades.185 
The 2003 Afghanistan Constitution explicitly provides for the promotion and 
protection of human rights.  The protection of human rights and respect for the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are mentioned in the preamble, and articles six and seven 
respectively.  Article 58 provides for the establishment of the Afghanistan Independent 
Human Rights Commission, which one scholar describes as a relatively high-profile and 
effective mechanism for promoting and protecting human rights.186  Among many others, 
there are provisions for equality (through not specifically mentioning equality between 
men and women), health care, education, the right to life, a legal trial, and freedom from 
torture.   
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However, there is a kind of caveat to these provisins; article three of the 
Constitution states that, “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of 
Islam and the values of this Constitution” and article 120 states that in cases that are not 
already considered by the Constitution or the penal code, the courts must defer to Sharia 
Law.187  Thus, the human rights articulated in the Constitution may be open to radical 
interpretation based on an extreme view of the provisi ns of Islam.  International Crisis 
Group notes that the Constitution “provides no clarity on resolving conflicts between 
international human rights law and Islamic law, for example, on disparities between men 
and women under Sharia with regard to inheritance rights and court testimony.”188  The 
2006 case of Abdul Rahman, who was sentenced to the death penalty for converting from 
Islam to Christianity but was eventually granted asylum in Italy, is a primary example of 
the application of article 3. 
The 2006 Afghanistan Compact, another agreement between the international 
community and the Afghan government, also includes human rights terms.  As 
mentioned, the Compact “identifies three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of 
activity for the five years from the adoption of this Compact: 1) security; 2) governance, 
rule of law and human rights; and 3) economic and social development.”189  The Compact 
is meant to be implemented under the framework of the 2008 Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS), which is Afghanistan’s poverty reduction strategy.  The 
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ANDS is meant to help guide international donor assistance and considers, among other 
issues, how human rights are to be protected and implemented.190 
An Afghan-owned human rights agenda is critical.  Several scholars in the field 
and non-governmental organizations warn against the effectiveness of a blanket approach 
to entrenching human rights in Afghanistan from theop down.  They note that a 
grassroots strategy is required whereby “human rights are made relevant to the local 
population.”191 Afghans should be able to prioritize what rights are important to them and 
to focus on promoting and protecting those rights tat could improve their quotidian 
existence.192  The daily experience of human rights, such as freedom from abuse, freedom 
from violence, and the ability to appear in public without shame, has been identified as 
the highest priority when attempting to develop a culture of human rights.193  It is 
necessary to develop an inclusive and participatory dialogue to learn about the priorities 
of average Afghans and gather a clearer picture of what will likely work and not work 
there.  As Bhikhu Parekh advocates, a human rights agenda must be based in open and 
cross-cultural dialogue.194  It is crucial for analysis to be as inclusive and participatory as 
possible, so as to identify those changes that are most likely to ameliorate living 
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standards.195  Such contextual assessments are necessary to devel p realistic and feasible 
solutions to the significant social, economic, and political problems in Afghanistan. 
To begin, Afghans from every demographic need to be made aware of their rights 
under Afghan law; human rights must be “given meaning through explanation, education, 
and publicity through a range of strategic mechanisms, from the village to the 
parliament.”196  Although human rights have been somewhat institutionalized, it is only at 
a superficial level, as most Afghans are simply unaware of their rights.  Indeed, as 
Leanne Smith points out, most international human rights treaties have yet to be 
translated into either of Afghanistan’s official languages, Dari and Pashtu.197  Moreover, 
according to 2005 statistics, only 43 percent of the adult male population and 12.6 
percent of the adult female population are literate.198  (In Kandahar, a mere five percent 
of women and 22 percent of men are literate.199)  
It is critical to emphasize in Afghanistan that human rights are not only a western 
preoccupation.  A human rights approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding is not, to use 
one scholar’s expression, a “modern mission civilisatrice.”200 The rights that are 
enshrined in Afghan law are not absolute but are instead subject to a degree of 
interpretation.  The inclusion of human rights does not mean implementing Canadian, 
American, or other interpretations of human rights, but rather recognizing that “universal 
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human rights, properly understood, leave considerabl  space for national, regional, 
cultural particularity and other forms of diversity and relativity.”201  In order for such an 
approach to work, the Afghan government’s nascent sovereign authority to implement 
human rights must be encouraged. 
Conflicts between human rights and Islamic law will certainly increase tensions in 
Afghanistan, but it is possible to prioritize rights in such a way that a human rights 
agenda is realized.  As mentioned, education and awareness campaigns must extend to 
every stratum of society, from the rural labourer to the police officer to the politician to 
the judge.  Working from An Na’im, the framework for a common culture of universal 
human rights exists, but cultural legitimacy in Afghanistan must be established through 
cross-cultural and internal dialogue.202  For instance, An Na’im juxtaposes the right of 
freedom from cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatmen with the Quranic punishment of 
amputating the right hand of a convicted thief.  Hedetermines that because of the 
religious importance of this punishment, its aboliti n is unlikely, but much could be done 
to limit its implementation.  Although An Na’im’s suggestion that the religious moral 
standards of a society should determine the application of human rights poses 
problems,203 this represents one example of a cross-cultural dialogue on human rights and 
illuminates one way to make human rights relevant to the population of Afghanistan. 
The Status of Human Rights in Afghanistan 
Although progress has occurred in areas such as the re urn of refugees, child 
mortality rates, and school enrolment rates, the abysmal human rights situation in 
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Afghanistan demonstrates the limits of institutionalization that stagnates at the political 
level.204  The continuously deteriorating security situation taints every aspect of 
development.  2008 was the bloodiest year for civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 205  One 
hundred thirty-eight suicide attacks caused 373 deaths.206  Insecurity has severely 
restricted mobility, particularly for non-governmental organizations and other 
international workers.  Hundreds of schools and clinics have had to close to due violence.  
Politicians and reformers are often targeted for assas ination by Taliban elements.  In the 
Kandahar region, people feel more insecure, further undermining the international 
mission and the legitimacy of the Afghan government.207  There are reports of militants 
using women and children as human shields.  It is well-understood that the security 
situation is almost consistently worsening and it is clear that this prevents meaningful 
development from taking place. 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
In 2007, Afghanistan ranked 174th out of 178 countries on the United Nations 
Human Development Index.208  Although the Constitution provides for freedom from 
torture, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, they are not respected in practice.  
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Prisoners are routinely tortured and prison standards are poor.  Journalists face 
intimidation and harassment, and fear reprisals.  Religious minorities face persecution.  
As mentioned, no law can be contrary to Islam and conversion from Islam is punishable 
by death. 
Thirty percent of the population faced famine at the beginning of the winter of 
2008-2009209 and there appears to be even less aid reaching Afghans outside of major 
centres.210  More than two million school age children are notable to attend school and 
attendance is especially hard for girls.  In Novembr 2008, a group of girls on their way 
to school were sprayed with acid, badly injuring several of them.211  Child abuse is 
endemic and sexual abuse of children widespread.  Labour rights are few and according 
to UNICEF, there are more than one million working Afghan children under the age of 
14.  Afghanistan is also a source, transit point, ad destination for human trafficking. 
According to data reported in 2007, on the Gender Development Index 
Afghanistan ranked second last only to Niger.  Women face disproportionate levels of 
violence and harassment, and women in public life are particularly threatened.  Most 
women have little or no legal recourse.  According to NGO reports, hundreds of 
thousands of women continue to suffer abuse at the hands of men and according to the 
NGO Womankind, 87% of women consider themselves to be victims of violence, half of 
which is sexual violence.212  Women are not required to wear the burqa by federal law, 
but local authorities sometimes harass women regarding their appearance.  Women are 
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used to settle debts.  Although rape is criminalized, rape by a spouse is not.  
Approximately forty to sixty percent of marriages are forced and almost sixty percent of 
brides are under the legal marrying age of 16.  Women have little access to health and 
obstetrics services.  In the 2007 UN Development Report, the maternal mortality rate is 
estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 live births, and in the remote district of Badakhshan, the 
rate was 6,500 per 100,000 live births, which is the highest rate ever recorded.  Women 
are largely unaware of their rights, especially in the rural south.    
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
One of the most pressing concerns in Afghanistan is that the government does not 
have the appropriate level of administrative capacity to deliver good government.213  
Citizens lack confidence in formal justice institutions, leaving a serious deficit in 
legitimacy of the government.  The problems associated with delivering aid noted by the 
Canadian government in its 2009 fourth quarter report on Afghanistan seem to be 
contributing to increasing disillusionment among Afghans both with their government 
and international aid agencies.  Although the 2004 Presidential election was the first 
election in more than thirty years, problems remain with regard to the political 
framework, effective governance, and transparency.  Among those elected in the 2005 
National Assembly elections were warlords and officials associated with organized crime 
and human rights abuses.  The August 2009 presidential lection will likely be a seminal 
point in the state of democratic development. 
The government has limited authority outside of Kabul.  Corruption, nepotism, 
and cronyism remain almost unchecked, as there are insufficient monitoring mechanisms 
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and little public accountability.  Freedom House considers that corruption and waste in 
the government are the most pressing challenges to ustainable development and 
Afghanistan ranks 176th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2008 
Corruption Perceptions Index.214  Political reconciliation in Afghanistan still appears to 
be a pipedream, and the capacity of the government to deliver development programs 
continues to decline.   
RULE OF LAW 
The rule of law is severely lacking throughout Afghanistan.  In May 2008, the UN 
special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, Philip Alston, reported on security forces 
killing civilians with impunity and noted that extrajudicial killings of women are 
especially overlooked.  Official impunity remains pervasive at all administrative levels.  
According to Amnesty International, the justice and security sectors do not have the 
personnel, infrastructure, and political will to protect and promote human rights and 
human rights violations occur with impunity.215  Despite the priority the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) receives from the international community, it has only managed to develop 
one functioning brigade and has little overall capacity.  It is implicated in human rights 
violations and corruption.  Likely as a result of these deficiencies, according to Canada’s 
fourth quarterly report, trust in the ANA declined slightly during this period.   
The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is handicapped by corruption, inadequate 
training, illiteracy, involvement in drug trafficking, ineffective bureaucracy, high levels 
of desertion, and a reputation for using excessive force.  These problems are endemic 
throughout Afghanistan’s public institutions and are indicative of the greater frustrations 
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with building its state capacity.  Although the law prohibits arbitrary detention and arrest, 
both are widespread.  Police often detain women at their families’ behest for allegedly 
disobeying the family wishes.  The capacity of the ANP has only improved marginally in 
the past few years and there are no key districts where the majority of Kandaharis 
perceive an improvement in security, despite increased training programs and 
infrastructure projects.   
The judicial branch of the Karzai government is considered to be the most corrupt 
ministry.216  Despite the utter lack of due process and fair trial procedures, in 2008 the 
government executed 17 prisoners.  Detention facilities fall far short of international 
standards.  Traditional tribal councils continue to handle an estimated eighty percent of 
all disputes, especially in rural areas, and judges on the Supreme Court have religious 
rather than civil jurisprudence training.217  Too little progress has been made on the 
twinned issues of capable and accountable Afghan security forces (the ANA and the 
ANP) and the need for an independent and competent judiciary, both of which are 
required for sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan.218  
The disarmament process is undermined by programs executed by the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada to rearm informal ilitias as a counterinsurgency 
force.  NATO forces continue to hand over detainees to Afghanistan’s intelligence 
service, the National Directorate of Security, which violates human rights with impunity 
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and lacks transparency.  Canada has been widely criticized for its track record of turning 
prisoners over to Afghan authorities, where they are subject to the abusive and tortuous 
practices of the Afghan police and military (discussed in detail later in this chapter). 
A Human Rights Approach in Afghanistan 
The incorporation of human rights in the peacebuilding and statebuilding exercise 
in Afghanistan is by no means simple.  The inclusion of human rights into peacebuilding 
and statebuilding strategies in Afghanistan is congruent both with the kinds of “new 
realism” discussed earlier and with the OECD-DAC document “Principles for Good 
International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations,” which links human rights to 
accountability, legitimacy, and strategies to prevent fragility.219  The Canadian Council 
for International Cooperation (CCIC) explains that a human rights approach to fragile 
states such as Afghanistan could provide,  
provisions for transparency, accountability, and equal 
treatment…;…a basis for greater engagement between 
actors…;…a better understanding of the causes of 
fragility…;…strategies to mitigate the most adverse 
conditions…;…participation strategies to engage 
vulnerable groups; and strategies to curtail the abuse of 
power.220 
 
Derek Evans goes further, suggesting that the link between human rights 
standards and the normative aspects of statebuilding ca  be as explicit as, 
Defin[ing] the role and purpose of the state…; 
establish[ing] the core principles that guide the relations 
between the state as duty-bearer and the members of 
society as rights-holders…;…prescrib[ing] a framework of 
obligations or duties to shape the application of these 
principles through the functions of the 
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state…;…provid[ing] a set of key analytical criteria to 
assist in identifying contextual priorities…. 221
Although this thesis does not make the case for human rights as the normative basis of 
states, Evans compellingly outlines the possibilities inherent in a human rights approach.  
These authors describe a list of tools that includes monitoring, quietly supporting civil 
society groups engaged in human rights issues, helping marginalized groups participate in 
dialogue and generally supporting open dialogue, setting international standards, offering 
technical assistance, and the kinds of diplomatic, economic, and military tools described 
earlier. 
The literature on peacebuilding and statebuilding emphatically reiterates that 
prolonged external statebuilding produces a weak stte.  Although the international 
community must be aware that human rights cannot be forc d from the top down, local 
ownership does not preclude learning from the experience of the international 
community.  It is critical to emphasize that the Afghan government is ultimately 
accountable to Afghans, not to the international donor community.  Scholars such as 
Oliver Richmond and Michael Pugh complain of a liberal one-size-fits-all approach to 
peacebuilding and statebuilding that leaves no room f r alternative thinking.222  A 
genuine human rights approach to statebuilding in Afghanistan could assist in alleviating 
those fears by providing an opportunity for the type of contextual analysis that could 
allow for a locally-driven process.  By developing an inclusive and participatory dialogue 
about human rights and learning about the priorities of average Afghans, national and 
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international authorities will gather a clearer picture of what will likely work and not 
work there.   
Using a framework employed in much of the peacebuilding literature, Evans 
outlines three principles upon which international ctors should focus when 
implementing a human rights policy: ensuring protection and security to individuals and 
communities; supporting the development of a culture of democratic governance; and 
strengthening the capacity for equitable access to e sential public services.223  Canada can 
work to implement those human rights that are a priority for Afghans at the grassroots 
level by liaising with Afghan and international stakeholders to begin the process of 
promoting human rights in a way that resonates with ordinary Afghans.224  While 
narrative correlation is not causation, there is the possibility that, “human rights provides 
a…framework for engaging the complex challenges of institutional development from 
above (legal standards), from below (social mobilization processes), and from within 
(accountability instruments).”225 
Of course, it is possible that a Canadian human rights foreign policy could 
achieve very little in Afghanistan.  Tensions will likely be exacerbated and conflict will 
likely occur.  Human rights could be manipulated as a tool to advance many interests, 
probably from disparate groups and some of which are likely to conflict.  Those who 
promote and protect human rights will probably find themselves in increasingly 
vulnerable positions.  Afghans will likely suffer in order to implement a commitment to a 
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human rights agenda.  There is a moral dilemma implicit in this.  Yet the possibilities 
inherent in a human rights approach to Canadian policy in Afghanistan suggest that 
Canada’s role as a catalyst can ignite a process that will yield a stronger and healthier 
Afghan state, as well as a tool for achieving Canadian objectives. 
Human Rights and Canadian Objectives in Afghanistan 
A human rights approach to Canadian policy in Afghanistan could provide an 
opportunity to refocus the structure of the mission there and provide sustainable and 
productive policy options.  The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is 
responsible for helping to maintain a secure enviroment in which the Afghan 
government can operate.  Over the past several years of intervention, the critiques and 
challenges surrounding the international mission have remained remarkably consistent.  
Despite the international effort, problems of legitimacy, Afghan-owned development, 
sustainability, security, and accountability are as pertinent in 2009 as they were in the 
early years of the mission.  Using the previous discus ion as a starting point, the 
following section will briefly demonstrate how a human rights approach could improve 
Canada’s capacity to realize its stated six priorities in Afghanistan.  Much could be 
accomplished from encouraging an open and participaory dialogue that includes 
marginalized and vulnerable groups.  There is an elem nt of imaginative creativity 
required for this type of exercise, but perhaps after nearly nine years of Canadian 
engagement in Afghanistan, political imagination is what is needed for sustainable 
progress. 
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1) ENABLE THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN KANDAHAR TO SUSTAIN A SAFER 
ENVIRONMENT AND PROMOTE LAW AND ORDER 
The police represent an immediate method of establihing a local government 
presence and are required for establishing basic rule of law and “for overcoming the 
downward spiral in legitimacy.”226  Several key scholars in the field suggest that 
supporting the ANP ought to be one of the primary priorities of international 
engagement,227 yet Canada has reported consistently negative results in this area.  These 
failures have occurred despite Canada’s $99 million c mmitment for the period of 2008 
to 2011 for training, mentoring, and equipping the ANA and the ANP; building capacity 
in administration and logistical support; and complementary initiatives in the justice and 
correctional systems to support activities of the ANP.228  Such a lack of sustained 
progress suggests that there is considerable room to attempt to implement a new 
framework that centres on human rights within Canad’s strategy for achieving its first 
priority.   
Canada’s involvement in training programs could provide an ideal opportunity to 
promote a culture of human rights within Afghan security forces.  Reducing the number 
of human rights violations perpetrated by the ANA and ANP is plainly crucial.  Fewer 
victims at the hands of security may increase the confidence Afghans have in their 
security forces, and in turn, in their government.  Human rights abuses perpetrated by 
government security forces serve to further destabilize populations, undermining efforts 
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to facilitate security and respect for rule of law.  Impunity for such abuses suggests that 
there is no one who can be held accountable for violations, further alienating these 
government representatives from the general population.  Furthermore, the 
implementation of a human rights agenda whereby the kinds of human rights discussed 
earlier are protected and promoted may have the additional effect of reducing need and 
vulnerability, which may in turn reduce lawlessness caused by desperation. 
2) STRENGTHEN AFGHAN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO DELIVER BASIC SERVICES 
Canada has pledged to help build the confidence of Afghans in their own 
government by enhancing the Afghan government’s ability to provide basic services and 
improve the daily lives of Afghans.  From 2008 to 2011, $210 million has been allocated 
to this priority, which includes $50 million for the Dahla Dam signature project and $12 
million for the schools signature project.  Discouragingly, despite the size of this 
allocation, according to Canada’s most recent quarterly report, the government’s capacity 
to deliver development programs is actually declining. 
Disparate international and Canadian roles have also had the detrimental effect of 
contributing to the delegitimation of the Afghan government.  Although the Afghan 
government lacks the capacity, large-scale infrastructu e and institution-building projects 
draped in the flags of NATO countries send a signal to Afghans that their government is 
unable to contribute to Afghanistan’s development.  However, corruption and 
mismanagement by Afghan authorities prevent resources from reaching their intended 
destinations and international donors become frustrated by the wasted funds and lack of 
progress.  This is a complex problem of statebuilding, especially because in fragile states 
a social contract between the governed and the governing is absent, whereby society does 
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not trust the government to deliver basic public servic s and the government cannot 
deliver them.  In other words, “legitimacy is what is lacking in fragile states.”229   
A development focus that reinforces the legitimacy of the Afghan government 
could do much to repair the capacity and authority of the Afghan government.230 
Development projects must be done in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan 
in order to bolster its legitimacy but constructive management programs and anti-
corruption mechanisms must ensure the just distribution of funds.  In this case, a human 
rights approach would include provisions for accountability and transparency that could 
aid in the delivery of resources to where they are meant to go.  The government would be 
accountable to its citizens, not just to international donors.  Resources would be 
distributed without discrimination and needs would be assessed with the input of the 
greater population, perhaps serving to extend the influence of the central government 
beyond Kabul as well as instigating interaction with marginalized groups. 
3) PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE 
The provision of humanitarian aid entails a $111 million commitment from 2008 
to 2011 to provide food (distributed through the World Food Programme) and non-food 
aid to vulnerable populations, as well as offer vaccinations and facilitate landmine 
clearance and awareness.  Included in this allocatin is up to $60 million for Canada’s 
struggling polio eradication signature project.  It is clear that humanitarian assistance is 
necessary for the fulfilment of basic rights and may help alleviate some of the social 
causes of violence.  Canada’s commitment to providing humanitarian assistance likely 
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means that it recognizes that a population strugglin  to survive is unable to positively 
participate in society. 
Although presumably human rights principles are already part of Canada’s 
motivation for providing humanitarian assistance, a thoroughly integrated human rights 
approach might begin to depoliticize the provision of aid.  Despite Canadian guidelines 
on Civilian-Military Coordination, the security-first thinking of the mission means that 
Canadian Forces are now expected to engage in what used to be considered development 
work.  As part of the strategy to ‘win hearts and minds’ in Afghanistan, the military 
wants to execute small-scale projects that provide immediate aid to communities and that 
are clearly associated with Canada’s presence there.  Th se projects include short-term 
emergency relief, engaging with local communities, working on infrastructure projects, 
and cooperating with development actors.231  DND wants to ensure that Afghans are 
aware of Canada’s investment in their country and is sometimes critical of CIDA for not 
helping to make the connection between Canada’s military actions and its development 
and reconstruction efforts.232  This strategy is frequently criticized for unfairly 
implicating neutral development and humanitarian aid workers in the military and 
therefore putting them at risk.  Furthermore, Canadian Forces’ involvement in 
development has sometimes had negative effects, especially when it is used as a tool to 
gather intelligence, is dangled as reward or withdrawn as punishment, or when it does not 
coordinate with other aid programs.233   
                                                
231 Patrick Travers and Taylor Owen, “Between Metaphor and Strategy: Canada’s Integrated Approach to 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Journal 63.3 (2008): 692. 
232 Col. M.P. Jorgensen, “A Strategy for Effective Peace-Building: Canada’s Whole-of-Government 
Approach in Afghanistan,” Prepared for Canadian Forces College: National Security Studies Programme 
10, 20 May 2008, 29, available at http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/nssc/nssc10/jorgensen.pdf. 
233 Ibid, 8.  
 73
CIDA’s emphasis on building state institutions works towards increasing the 
capacity of the Afghan government, something small-scale projects emblazoned with the 
Canadian flag cannot do.  Communication between military and civilian actors is further 
compromised because while NGOs may be concerned about preserving their neutrality in 
the Afghan mission, the military is extremely careful about how its own intelligence is 
used.234  Thus, development assistance is using a range of d vices, which adds another 
layer of complication to an already complex approach.  Recognizing that it is a fairly 
recent aspect of security operations, it seems evident that the military does not have the 
requisite knowledge to deliver aid effectively.  Additionally, considering that maintaining 
control over regions rather than overcoming anti-government forces is the challenge, 
protecting human rights, providing humanitarian assistance and working with 
development agencies are especially important.235 
Aid must be provided without discrimination and allocated based on contextual 
analysis of needs on the ground that considers all partners.  A broader focus on human 
rights in the pursuit of this priority would take into account the daily needs of Afghans 
and permit aid to reach those who need it most.  Furthermore, by limiting the immediate 
associations between defence and development, a humn rights approach could allow aid 
and development workers more mobility to deliver aid.  
4) ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY WITH FACILITATION OF AFGHAN-PAKISTANI DIALOGUE  
The strategic importance of border control cannot be understated.  Most of the 
remaining Taliban fighters are located in frontier areas of Pakistan dominated by the 
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Pashtun ethnic group and pose a significant threat to security and stability in the region.  
These border regions have become a safe haven for Taliban and terrorist elements. Drug 
smuggling and other criminal activity, the growth of transnational terrorist networks, and 
refugee flows are among the issues that must be addressed when considering border 
security. Canada has allocated $32 million for thispriority, which is meant to foster a 
dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, stimulate discussions with border officials 
from both sides, train border officials, and fund ifrastructure and equipment.  Thus far, 
little has been achieved. 
Through the contextual analysis implicit in a human rights approach and by 
incorporating human rights into these initiatives, a more open and participatory dialogue 
may emerge through both demonstrations of cultural awareness and non-discriminatory 
practices.  A human rights approach could stress less violent means of conflict resolution 
among moderate elements, and could include, for example, curtailing the use of airpower 
in the dangerous border regions, which demonstrates littl  regard for civilian populations 
and subverts counterinsurgency efforts.236  It could stress the importance of the security 
of the people in the region, rather than traditional notions of security that focus on the 
state.  Ideally, tensions would be reduced through an improved understanding of priorities 
and strategies in the region resulting from a human rights approach. 
5) HELP ADVANCE AFGHANISTAN’S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
The fifth of Canada’s priorities concerns support for national institutions, to 
which Canada is providing up to $355 million in fundi g for 2008-2011.  Canada is 
concentrating its efforts on technical and financial support for elections, an independent 
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national electoral commission, and providing technial and training support and 
equipment to certain national institutions and departments.  A human rights approach to 
this objective would emphasize transparency and accountability in order to strengthen the 
social contract between the Afghan people and theirgovernment.  Within a human rights 
approach, “State institutions are envisioned as being directed towards promoting, both 
domestically and internationally, an inclusive political and social environment 
characterized by tolerant multiculturalism.”237  Such an approach could also recognize 
that free and fair elections are not enough.  Although Canada, and specifically Elections 
Canada, Canada’s independent non-partisan electoral agency, can offer much support and 
guidance to the Afghan democratic process, Canada must recognize that democratic and 
governance institutions are part of a greater effort to improve the relations between the 
government and the governed, a task that is only beginning once the votes are tallied.238 
There is the risk that democratic institutions in fragile states will foment tensions 
and thus lead to conflict, despite the goals of limiting the arbitrary exercise of power and 
providing a voice to the marginalized.  It is widely recognized that politically and 
economically inclusive governance practices are requi d to mitigate this risk.239  The 
links between democratic development and poverty reduction, made clear in numerous 
UNDP documents, suggest that, 
…much of the helplessness and sense of powerlessness of 
poor people comes from the experience with corrupt, 
uncaring, inefficient officers and public authorities. Free 
and fair elections, a free and independent media, a 
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separation of powers, and encouragement of an open civil 
society are all important for poverty reduction.240  
A human rights approach could encourage the kinds of freedoms essential for the 
development of effective and accountable public institutions, such as freedom of the 
press, association, expression, and so forth.  It could also ensure that the voices of 
marginalized groups are heard and that civil society groups are able to act as 
accountability mechanisms.  In a human rights approach good governance is democratic 
governance, which means that rights must be respected, protected, and promoted within 
all segments of the population. 
6) FACILITATE AFGHAN-LED POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 
Canada rightly places political reconciliation among its six priorities, pledging to 
support the Government of Afghanistan’s national reconciliation efforts with a $14 
million commitment from 2008 to 2011 to improve dialogue and the government’s 
capacity to communicate with its citizens. This is another aspect where Canadian efforts 
have failed to produce any significant progress.241  The international community has 
acknowledged that this kind of process requires open and participatory dialogue, but there 
remain serious knowledge gaps in cultural understanding.  This is obviously only one 
obstacle among many.  As this thesis has emphasized, a human rights approach requires 
contextual analysis, which could assist in determining causes of violence and perhaps 
allow for better communication with moderate elements of the insurgency. 242   
                                                
240 UNDP, Poverty Reduction and Human Rights: A Practice Note, June 2003, 16.  Available at 
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HRPN_(poverty)En.pdf. 
241 Canada. “Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Report to Parliament,” (Fourth Quarterly Report), 11. 
242 The Canadian government emphasizes its willingness only to cooperate with those who have renounced 
violence respect human rights and the rule of law, and accept the legitimacy of the Afghan government and 
the Afghan constitution.  However, Michael O’Hanlon suggests that, “perhaps an insufficient political 
reconciliation process that fails to include various elements of the insurgency has only fuelled instability in 
the country” (143). 
 77
Political reconciliation cannot occur if dialogue excludes large portions of the 
population.  Considerably less aid reaches those outside of the urban centres or those 
outside of regions where soldiers are stationed.  For example, with regard to Canadian 
aid, Canada focuses fifty percent of its aid on the Kandahar region, which is criticized as 
creating, “a disproportionate level of aid to the south to the neglect of poor and 
vulnerable communities in central and northern regions.”243  With regard to U.S. aid, 
since the 2001 invasion only five dollars in non-security related aid has actually reached 
the Pashtun people, per person, per year.244  Reconciliation requires, at the very least, an 
acknowledgement and understanding of past abuses and an awareness of the concerns of 
all groups.  A human rights approach could guide a dialogue that would be inclusive, 
participatory, open, productive, and nation-wide.  Canada recognizes that this process 
must be driven by Afghans, but does not seem to grasp that only a few Afghans, some of 
whom are complicit in human rights violations, are d iving the reconciliation process. 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A FRESH APPROACH? 
The point here is to further the argument that human rights are mutually inclusive 
and mutually supportive of other interests, and specifically, Canada’s national interests.  
There is certainly an element of idealism in these suggestions, but the objective is to 
present a fresh take on the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy and to substantiate 
the case for a Canadian human rights policy.  In Afghanistan, a Canadian human rights 
foreign policy could allow for a more productive and effective Canadian contribution to 
the Afghan statebuilding and peacebuilding process.  A  explained, it could strengthen 
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efforts to construct a functional relationship betwen Afghanistan and Afghans founded 
in accountability, sustainability, security, communication, and inclusion.  If Canada hopes 
to affect change in Afghanistan before the scheduled 2011 troop withdrawal date, a 
serious change in Canada’s approach is necessary.  
Human Rights and Canada’s Goals as Part of an International Mission 
A human rights policy in Afghanistan could not only help Canada better achieve 
its immediate national interests, it could also aidin the realization of its long-term 
national interests, as defined earlier using an English School perspective.  For Canada, as 
a state with limited influence and capital in the international system, the indicators of 
legitimacy, cooperation, and shared risk/decreased bur en are critical for Canada to attain 
its national interest of building a better [international] society in which to operate.  
However, it is challenging, if not impossible, to use positivist inquiry when exploring 
such elements of the English School.  Measuring legitimacy, international cooperation, 
and shared risk/decreased burden could require a level of conceptual stretching that could 
detract from the efforts of this thesis.  The next section will demonstrate how a human 
rights approach could yield Canadian national interests by bolstering Canadian 
legitimacy, Canada’s international cooperation, andthe opportunity to lessen the risk or 
burden of Canadian foreign policy.  This section will provide the remaining building 
blocks required for a normative analysis of why human rights should be the decisive 
element of Canadian foreign policy beyond the moral humanitarian argument. 
LEGITIMACY  
Earlier in the thesis, legitimacy is defined as behaviour that is generally 
considered acceptable, where a consensus exists that the ctions of a particular state are 
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tolerable within the realm of international society.  Martin Wight wrote that international 
legitimacy is “the principles that prevail…within a majority of the states that form 
international society, as well as the relations between them.”245  While admittedly an 
inherently unquantifiable concept, legitimacy, based on norms that are malleable and 
changeable, dictates the scope of actions a state is p rmitted to take without exacting 
punitive measures.  Vincent succinctly proposes that human rights add to the legitimacy 
of the state, as well as consolidate it.246 
Legitimacy evolves; as Neta Crawford states, “colonialism did not just fade away; 
it became illegitimate.”247  In a similar vein, action that subverts the interational 
consensus on human rights is now considered illegitmate.  This is the case for both the 
state and international society.  When human rights are inadequately implemented, the 
legitimacy of international society is undermined.248  States that actively undermine the 
international consensus surrounding human rights should no longer be able to be 
considered members of international society for this very reason.  Donnelly extends this 
sentiment to suggest that in the post-Cold War era,human rights have become a 
necessary condition of political legitimacy.249   
Human rights are only part of an array of norms that constitute legitimacy,250 but 
their evolution as an international norm forms part of the international consensus that 
makes up international society. Looking at Vincent’s work, Dunne explains how the 
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thinking surrounding international society can evolve to modify conceptions of 
legitimacy to include elements previously sanctified to the sphere of domestic politics by 
norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.251  International society, as aforementioned, 
is based on common interests and broad consensus.  Thus, behaviour that aims to 
strengthen the international consensus surrounding human rights can be considered 
legitimate.   
The focus here will be the legitimacy that derives from building and supporting 
the international consensus on human rights.  This consensus is the foundation of 
international society and a prerequisite for the maintenance or strengthening of 
international order, already described as Canada’s seminal national interest.  Specifically 
for this section, the argument is that were Canadian engagement in Afghanistan 
predicated on a human rights foreign policy, Canada could more easily realize its national 
interest by increasing the legitimacy of its actions i  Afghanistan through support of the 
international consensus on human rights.  This is not to suggest that Canada’s 
engagement in Afghanistan is publicly questioned by its NATO partners, but that the 
legitimacy of some aspects of the mission Afghanist and the mission itself are doubted 
by certain international and domestic actors, which limits Canada’s chances to realize its 
interests.  
The by-products of legitimacy are extensive.  Alison Brysk explains that, “...the 
intangible resource of legitimacy gained by a human rights foreign policy often delivers 
diffuse diplomatic rewards, like improved relations with transitional regimes, enhanced 
credibility, expanded coalitions, and transnational migration, education, and cooperation 
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ties that deliver real advantages...”252  Canada could leverage its increased legitimacy in 
order to garner diplomatic capital, increased influence, expanded economic opportunities, 
and so forth.  The Afghan detainee transfer scandal, briefly mentioned earlier in this 
work, will be employed to demonstrate one form of the relationship between legitimacy 
and a human rights approach.  The example will be examined from the standpoint of the 
legitimacy of Canadian action on the international stage, as well as with regards to 
domestic public opinion. 
In December 2005, then-Chief of Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces, General 
Rick Hillier signed a detainee transfer agreement with Afghanistan’s Defence Minister 
that mandated that all terrorism suspects and Taliban fighters captured by Canadian 
Forces in Afghanistan be turned over to the Afghan police or military, despite the 
accusations of abuse and torture levelled against Afghan authorities. 253  The agreement 
stipulated that the detainees would be treated in accordance with the Geneva 
Conventions, which forbid torture and inhumane treatment.  Under the agreement, 
Canada was to inform the International Committee of the Red Cross of their transfer, but 
would not follow-up on the condition of the prisoners.  In March 2007, former Canadian 
Minister of Defence Gordon O’Connor revealed that te Red Cross did not in fact inform 
Canadian officials of the treatment of Afghan prisoners, which contradicted previous 
claims by the Canadian government.   
At this time, Amnesty International Canada and the British Columbia Civil 
Liberties Association filed a case against Canada in Canadian Federal Court demanding 
                                                
252 Alison Brysk, Global Good Samaritans, 220. 
253 Unless stated otherwise, the following information on the detainee transfer scandal was obtained from 
an award-winning series of articles by Paul Koring i  The Globe and Mail from February 2007 to May 
2009. 
 82
an end to the transfer of Afghan detainees captured by Canadians to Afghan authorities.  
They unsuccessfully argued that this practice violated both Canada’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and Canada’s international human rights obligations, although they claim 
that the judges ruling, which raised concerns over th  treatment of detainees, sent a strong 
message.254 
In April 2007, The Globe and Mail newspaper conducted thirty interviews with 
Afghans detained by Canadian soldiers and transferred to Afghan prisons; these prisoners 
claimed that they were badly abused and mistreated.255  Following these revelations, the 
Canadian government announced a new agreement that allowed Canadian officials to 
access Afghan jails and exercise more control over th  treatment of detainees.  Despite 
the new agreement, allegations of torture of prisoners at the hands of Afghan authorities 
continued until Canada quietly decided to stop transferring prisoners into Afghan custody 
in January 2008.  Only a few weeks later, on 29 February 2008, Amnesty International 
Canada reported that Canada had resumed the transfer.256  It was later revealed that the 
Government of Canada was also aware that the Governr of Kandahar had been 
implicated in the abuse of prisoners.  Canadian Forces were also dogged by allegations 
that they themselves had mistreated Afghan prisoner, although an April 2009 report by 
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the Military Police Complaints Commission concluded that these allegations were largely 
unfounded.257 
In May 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to consider an appeal from 
Amnesty International Canada and the B.C. Civil Liberties Association.  Following the 
ruling, a lawyer for the groups, Paul Champ said, “Canada is now dead last on this 
issue...Just about every other democratic country has affirmed that military detainees held 
on foreign soil have human-rights protections in their domestic courts, including the 
U.S.”258 
Such an indictment of Canadian foreign policy present  an obvious challenge to 
the legitimacy of Canadian action.  From an internation l perspective, Canadian 
legitimacy was challenged because it refused to take a human rights approach to this 
aspect of its policy and even faced accusations of complicity in torture and abuse.  Some 
of Canada’s NATO allies, such as the British and the Dutch, took “a fundamentally 
different approach to safeguarding prisoners,” in that their agreements with the Afghan 
government provide more opportunity for monitoring.259  The Dutch and the Americans 
both have full access to prisons; the Dutch in particular are said to “have a better 
system.”260  That said, along with Canada, ISAF members have been criticized by human 
rights groups such as Amnesty International, which advocates halting transfers 
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completely until the Afghan justice system is better equipped to deal with detainees.261  
Clearly, if Canada or other ISAF members are implicated in abuse, it undermines the 
legitimacy of the mission.  Interestingly, related to the last indicator discussed here of 
shared risk/decreased burden, one of the proposed solutions to this issue is, “An ISAF-
wide facility …as it would permit burden sharing and would be easier to explain to the 
partners’ publics.”262  
 The importance of legitimacy is not restricted to the international sphere; the 
legitimacy of Canadian action in the eyes of the Canadian public is crucial for the 
implementation of government policy.  If the Government of Canada expects to be taken 
seriously when it advocates for a robust human rights agenda abroad, it must uphold the 
principles of human rights domestically.  As demonstrated by Figure 1, opposition to the 
mission in Afghanistan has increased fairly steadily s nce the mission began.  It is 
difficult to determine the connection between the perceived legitimacy of the Canadian 
mission in Afghanistan and the prisoner transfer scandal, but it is unlikely to have helped 
convince Canadians to support Canada’s engagement.  
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Figure 1. Tracking Canadian Support for the Mission n Afghanistan (EKOS). 263 
COOPERATION 
Through a consensus on the acceptability of Canadia action based on a human 
rights approach, enhanced Canadian legitimacy could yiel  improved opportunities for 
international cooperation, as well as enhanced integra ion between Canadian actors.  The 
structure of international society facilitates this cooperation in the same way that it 
constrains it by placing limits on acceptable behaviour.264  In this two-way street of 
legitimacy and cooperation, there is increased incentiv  for partnership, enhanced 
bilateral and multilateral relationships, and to enter into and uphold international 
agreements.  Thus, a human rights approach reinforces legitimacy at the same time as it 
encourages cooperation, which is required in order to tackle transnational challenges such 
as fragile states and terrorism.   
International society is more likely to flourish if it commands the consent of those 
states not among the powerful and affluent.265  Multilateral initiatives that include more 
than the usual suspects are generally found to be more comfortable avenues for 
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approaching human rights than bilateral settings.266  Moreover, multilateral cooperation is 
paramount for the good international citizen.267  Jennifer Welsh emphasizes this when she 
claims that,  
In the case of Afghanistan, a multilateral approach to 
reconstruction - driven by Afghans themselves through 
their National Development Framework - was deemed 
highly successful, whereas uncoordinated donor activity 
threatened to damage the legitimacy of the nascent Afghan 
government.268 
  
Canada is not alone in its failure to articulate an Afghanistan strategy or policy.  It 
would appear that, “…there was no agreed strategic plan or framework to deal with the 
long-term state-building enterprise needed to address the major problems facing 
[Afghanistan].  This lack of strategic vision has been typical of the Afghan mission from 
the beginning.”269  Canada is one of 42 countries participating in the ISAF mission and is 
clearly inhibited from implementing a WoG approach and its associated programs when 
there is an “almost total absence of international cohesion”270 and disparate goals and 
justifications within the mission exist.  By failing to encourage an internationally 
coherent and integrated approach to peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Canada has effectively 
limited the means at its disposal to achieve its goals diplomatically, developmentally, and 
militarily.  Moreover, Canada’s ability to realize an integrated approach is threatened 
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when its objectives are undermined by the actions of other states’ participation in the 
mission.271 
This breakdown is exacerbated by Canada’s own failure to implement an 
integrated approach to peacebuilding both at the fed ral level in Ottawa and on the 
ground in Afghanistan.  Mirroring the international situation, the various departments and 
organizations involved have their own priorities and agendas and therefore interpret the 
requirements of Canada’s approach differently.  Theexpressions of a common purpose 
by CIDA, DFAIT, and DND have been described as mere rhetoric,272 an “empty vessel” 
that is nothing new and a distraction from the realchallenges at hand in fragile states such 
as Afghanistan.273   
Since human security and human rights are supposed to be at the centre of 
Canada’s WoG approach and because universal human rights have been agreed to by 
both the international community and the Government of Afghanistan, a human rights 
approach could provide the basis for more sophisticated and progressive international 
cooperation.  A human rights direction could “add value as an analytical tool and 
operational priority for a new coordinated approach to Canada’s role in conflict affected 
states.”274  From such an approach, a unity of purpose could emerge among actors in 
Afghanistan that uses the language of rights to make real headway in achieving good 
governance, stability, human security, and overall development.  At the two distinct 
levels of Canadian and international policy, it could allow for a focal point among diverse 
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actors.  If internationally agreed-upon principles can form a foundation for engagement in 
Afghanistan, the necessary policy coherence and cooperation that has been so lacking 
may emerge.  Such a strategy would conceivably be coh rent, clearly communicated to 
the public, and would capitalize on the merits of a WoG approach and correct its 
shortcomings.   
A human rights approach that is based on participatory dialogue and is not 
imposed from the top down could also serve to build cooperation between international 
actors, including Canada, and Afghan actors.  It could mitigate accusations of political or 
cultural imperialism by considering statebuilding and peacebuilding in Afghanistan as an 
Afghan-driven enterprise and may provide avenues for partnership.  Such an approach 
could compel and drive an open inter- and intra-cultura  discussion that demonstrates 
respect and humility and is cautious in its methods.275  As Ian Smillie writes, the 
principles of good governance, including human rights, must be learned and relearned, by 
both Canada and Afghanistan.  Canada must be prepared to learn from its mistakes and 
acknowledge that the Canadian approach to governance is still “too young for dogmatism 
and certainty.”276  If Canada were to implement an explicit human rights approach, it 
would have to acknowledge that Canada still has much to learn about human rights and 
their application, in regards to both its international and domestic policies.   
SHARED RISK/DECREASED BURDEN 
Following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, there was a 
general consensus within the international community that the Taliban regime in 
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Afghanistan could no longer be tolerated.  This consensus provided the legitimacy to 
instigate international cooperation, thereby allowing members of international society to 
reduce risks and diffuse the burdens associated with engagement.  The collective 
response, considered as “an action taken by a significa t majority of states, based on a 
shared understanding that they are facing a threat that must be confronted through 
participation of all states,” could be construed as bolstering international society in an 
attempt to maintain international order.277  Anecdotally, the breadth of the response of the 
international community to Afghanistan contrasts with the level of international 
consensus that developed in response to the George W. Bush administration’s 
engagement in Iraq.   
Because a human rights approach could generate both increased legitimacy and 
enhanced cooperation, it could also likely yield an increased commitment to the mission 
and a willingness to share the burden involved.  If the mission could be developed within 
the framework of a human rights agenda, there is the possibility that Canada’s NATO 
partners would accept increased risk because the ben fits of such action would be clear.  
Such an approach, which has been expressly linked to sta e self-interest, could provide an 
acceptable justification for risk and assuage political fears of risk.  A human rights 
approach that has both legitimacy in international society and the cooperation of the 
international community could thereby enhance the willingness of states to participate in 
a dangerous mission such as the NATO mission in Afghanistan.   
According to a May 2009 poll, 75 percent of Canadians surveyed believed that 
Canada was shouldering a disproportionate amount of NATO’s burden in Afghanistan 
and 57 percent of those surveyed disagreed with the March 2008 decision to extend the 
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Afghan mission until 2011.278  Were a human rights approach to strengthen legitimacy, 
increase cooperation, and therefore mitigate some of the risk associated with engagement, 
the Canadian public may be more likely to support the mission.  Higher levels of public 
support could influence domestic legitimacy at home, and licence the Government of 
Canada to develop an exit strategy that allows it to bring the mission to fruition and 
realize its national interests.  Of course, this also applies to Canada’s NATO allies, who 
each, “considers its role in Afghanistan through its own political lenses.”279 
The cyclical benefits of a human rights approach could also work towards 
reducing the risk to Canadian and other internationl soldiers in Afghanistan by 
prioritizing the security of the Afghan citizenry.  A human rights approach to Afghanistan 
could preclude as much as possible the use of air strike  by NATO forces in civilian 
areas.  Human Rights Watch estimates that 119 civilians were killed in the first eight 
months of 2008 by NATO or U.S. aerial bombings.  Such death tolls obviously do little 
to engender support among the Afghan population and likely hinder counterinsurgency 
efforts by augmenting distrust of international actors and support for insurgent 
elements.280  Moreover, it likely serves to further delegitimize the mission among those 
actors who do not support the effort and could curtail new avenues of partnership. 
Were such engagement couched in a genuine commitment to a human rights 
agenda, the level of consensus could be expanded to include further commitment from 
states already involved in the conflict, as well as states that have thus far declined to be 
involved.  In Germany, for instance, the government has deployed forces outside of 
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Europe for the first time since the Second World War, but despite requests from NATO, 
the German government has been extremely hesitant to deploy German troops or 
equipment to the much more volatile Afghan south where the majority of Canadian 
troops are based.281  Up until the summer of 2009, when Germany launched a 300-soldier 
offensive operation to support Afghan forces, this stance allowed Germany to maintain its 
focus on reconstruction and development tasks.  The German Foreign Minister Franz 
Josef Jung has refused to label engagement in Afghanistan in overtly military terms.282  
Additionally, the majority of the German public does not support military engagement 
and “the military deployment of German troops needs to erve some kind of greater good 
to be considered legitimate in the eyes of most Germans.”283   
This stance has drawn considerable criticism from NATO allies such as Canada, 
as it potentially prolongs the exposure to conflict for Canadian troops and prevents 
Canada from reducing the number of Canadian soldiers and resources deployed there.  It 
seems clear that in this case, a human rights approch could allay some of the German 
concerns regarding combat and could buttress the German role in the mission, thereby 
augmenting the consensus required for a strong international society and better allowing 
Canada to realize its immediate interests of limiting ts sacrifice to the international 
mission and the long-term interest of strengthening international order. 
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LEGITIMACY , COOPERATION, AND SHARED RISK/DECREASED BURDEN: A TRIANGULAR 
AND SYNERGETIC RELATIONSHIP 
This section has demonstrated that a human rights foreign policy produces a 
synergetic relationship between the three indicators f legitimacy, cooperation, and 
shared risk/decreased burden.  This triangle, in which each point serves to reinforce the 
others, strengthens international society and therefore enables Canada to more effectively 
realize its national interests.  Supporting the inter ational consensus surrounding basic 
rights yields legitimacy, encourages cooperation, and diffuses the burden of engagement 
placed on the state.   
There are potential pitfalls in such an approach that could reveal themselves if it 
were implemented without contextual analysis, respect for Afghan priorities, and an 
appropriate commitment of time and resources.  Critically, for these indicators to 
positively affect international society and order, a long-term commitment to a human 
rights foreign policy is required.  In Afghanistan, that means staying the course until such 
a time when the departure of the international community will not bring Afghanistan back 
to the brink of state failure.  As part of this, the ability of the Afghan government to 
maintain sovereign control must be encouraged, especially considering the ultimate goal 
of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan is to ‘leave Afghanistan to Afghans.’ 
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4. Conclusion: In Canada’s Best Interests – A Canadian 
Approach to Human Rights in Foreign Policy 
An underlying theme in this work has been the need for middle ground in policy.  
Jennifer Welsh suggests that realism and idealism no lo ger adequately serve as an 
analytical tool in foreign policy; she lauds E. H. Carr for his insight in advocating for a 
“balance between utopia and reality.”284 The major international relations paradigms fail 
to provide a convincing rationale for the inclusion f human rights in foreign policy.  
Realism has too narrow a focus to account for the intricacies of international relations.  
Constructivism fails to provide tangible justifications for the foreign policy-maker to 
include human rights in foreign policy.  Although ideas from both schools are essential 
for analyzing foreign policy, the English School presents an ideal via media from which 
to study foreign policy, and specifically to develop a foreign policy that considers human 
rights as a national interest.  The inclusion of human rights in foreign policy has typically 
been justified in terms of constructivist value and identity concepts, but this paper has 
attempted to move beyond constructivism to make a case for the inclusion of human 
rights in foreign policy.  As Canada’s largest and costliest foreign policy priority, 
Canadian engagement in Afghanistan is the logical avenue from which to express the 
relationship between human rights and Canada’s natio l nterests.  
The concept articulated here is not especially radical.  “Good Global Samaritans”, 
to use Alison Brysk’s phrase, “have learned to see th mselves as interconnected members 
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of a global community that works best for everyone when human rights are respected.”285  
Even scholars such as Cranford Pratt who suggest that a uman rights agenda should only 
be motivated by a moral concern for the well-being of others or those such as Jennifer 
Welsh who suggest that a human rights agenda should be motivated by Canadian identity 
politics, still recognize the utility and practicality of basing foreign policy on national 
interests.  Gradually, a new segment of internationl relations is recognizing that some 
form of ‘new realism’ must emerge in order to sufficiently motivate policy-makers to 
include human rights in foreign policy.  The human rights community may be 
encouraging this out of a moral impetus, but they should recognize that morality and 
values are too flimsy a foundation upon which to base a concept as critical to the 
progression and evolution of international society and the strengthening of international 
order. 
Early in this thesis, common interests were described as being the mechanism 
establishing the relationship between human rights and foreign policy.  Common interests 
and consensus form the basis of international society.  A robust international society, in 
which international order is maintained and encouraged, is the best environment in which 
Canada can operate.  The protection and promotion of human rights bolsters the 
international consensus surrounding human rights and can be interpreted as a common 
interest.  The principles of enlightened self-interest and good international citizenship that 
contribute to contemporary international society further advance the status of human 
rights.  As Vincent puts forward, human rights fortify and consolidate international 
society.286  The contention made here that a human rights appro ch could generate 
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Canadian national interests is based in this theoretical framework of international society 
and order.   
This concept is particularly important in the case of Afghanistan, where the 
international community is fighting a war that has cost thousands of lives.  In Canada, 
billions of dollars and over one hundred and twenty soldiers’ lives have been spent.  
High-profile calls for Canada to remain in Afghanistan past the scheduled 2011 pull-out 
date have already begun.  A Canadian human rights foreign policy offers a way out that 
can allow Canada and its international partners to achieve their goals in Afghanistan and 
could support the development of an exit strategy for the international community in 
Afghanistan.  At this point, “the failure thus far of ISAF to succeed in its mission has 
fuelled calls from certain quarters for a withdrawal and an end to international military 
involvement in Afghanistan”;287  but to leave at this point would solve few problems and 
could engender the kind of violent opposition to NATO members that incited the mission 
in the first place.  The chances of any success in the NATO mission or Canada’s 
engagement in Afghanistan are dwindling; a human rights approach offers not only a way 
out, but also a way to make it work. 
By focusing on human rights, the means to achieve the mission (Canada’s six 
objectives) as well as the ends themselves (peacebuilding and statebuilding) could be 
realized. As a Canadian lieutenant based in Kandahar stated in a recent interview, “In the 
end it helps them [Afghans], and helps us also.”288  It is clear that this is not an easy 
proposition, but Canada and NATO’s limited prospects could be vastly improved by such 
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an approach.  Furthermore, the inclusion of human rights in policy transforms rights from 
an intractable moralistic or altruistic endeavour into a tool that can generate clear benefits 
for international actors.  Vicious cycles of miscommunication, violence, and poverty, 
become virtuous cycles of the protection and promotion of human rights in the context of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding.  
In a post-bipolar era, good international citizenship, an idea that “can clearly be 
placed within the international society tradition or English School,”289 has meant that 
states are reacting to normative changes in international relations with an increased 
commitment to humanitarian responsibilities.  However, as Bull noted in his 1983 Hagey 
Hall lectures at the University of Waterloo, justice and order are inextricably linked; Bull 
states that, “the measures that are necessary to achieve justice...are the same measures 
that will maximise the prospects of international order or stability…”290  As Linklater and 
Suganami explain, states generally require a politica  reason for defending justice and are 
unlikely to “defend justice for its own sake.”291  What this signifies is that a human rights 
approach to foreign policy implemented by a good international citizen is in everyone’s 
interest. 
The implications of this type of approach are far reaching.  It means that policy-
makers must reorient their thinking towards human rights.  Human rights become a 
means to achieving an end, as well as an end in and of themselves.  The weakening of 
norms surrounding sovereignty and the new dialectic of human security, statebuilding, 
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and peacebuilding suggest a realization among states hat, “the advances of human rights 
and global economic justice have become the only reliabl  paths to security.”292  Thus, 
human rights become a part of the vocabulary of the for ign policy-maker, not just as an 
afterthought, but as the priority.  Human rights become part of a long-term strategy for 
reasserting Canadian objectives and forging the requisite environment for achieving such 
interests.  In such a strategy, human rights and national interests must be considered 
hand-in-hand.  Canada’s national interests need to be evaluated in terms of the overall 
contribution to strengthening international society, whereby human rights are recognized 
for their constructive role. 
A human rights policy is sometimes prefaced in the p rase “first do no harm” as a 
minimum course of action.293  Other than the obvious need to not commit or be complicit 
with abuse, such as in the case of the prisoner transfer scandal, this sentiment is not 
explored here for several reasons.  Firstly, there is no way of knowing the future effects a 
policy might have.  It is possible to hypothesize, but a knowledgeable hypothesis would 
require the kind of contextual analysis that would a low for a more meaningful policy.  
Secondly, such a policy perceives human rights from t o narrow a perspective.  In this 
case, human rights are considered a value that would be imposed on another state, which 
is what this thesis has attempted to refute.  Finally, it serves as an evasion tactic for 
policy-makers to avoid including human rights in policy.   
As part of a long-term and purposeful strategy for foreign policy in Canada, the 
policy shift that occurs would mean that there would be the necessary corporate 
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knowledge and capacity to include human rights issue , from the perspective of those 
affected, in every briefing note and policy paper handed in at DFAIT, as well as the other 
government departments and agencies responsible for Canada’s international policies.  
Through training, research, and reinforcement, human rights as a foreign policy norm 
could undergo the process of norm cascade in the sam  way that human rights evolved to 
become a norm in international law.  Human rights could thus become institutionalized 
within the bureaucracy.  In some cases, a policy will not be directed towards changing 
another state’s behaviour, but rather it might aim to “contribute to maintaining or 
transforming the international normative environment [and/or]…to influence dominant 
conceptions of political legitimacy.”294  This will be part of a broader balancing between 
short term political objectives and immediate needs and a longer-term strategic vision.   
This balance requires real leadership first and foremost, as well as a government 
willing to make a sufficient investment in careful planning and programming.  The 
values-based approach trumpeted by Canada’s government has failed to yield a human 
rights policy that can produce results.  Leadership t at is willing to take risks, invest in 
the development of clear policy, communicate that policy to Canadians, and sufficiently 
produce contextual analysis is required if Canada ever hopes to make progress in 
Afghanistan or in the rest of its international initiatives.  Canada can no longer maintain a 
foreign policy that “still relies more on superficial impressions than on sound and detailed 
knowledge.”295 
A human rights approach would also require sufficient Canadian presence on the 
ground to analyze, monitor, and report back on international situations, and determine 
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what a human rights approach could do in those situations.  It would mean revisiting the 
decisions to decimate foreign affairs budgets so that DFAIT personnel can be sent abroad 
and embassies can remain open and productive liaisons between Canada’s government 
and the host government.  A strong international presence is required for the contextual 
analysis that would allow Canada to better determine where to focus its programming and 
priorities.  As the literature emphasizes, for an international human rights policy to be 
meaningful, there have to be local partners on the ground who take ownership of their 
own human rights.  In those cases where Canada is not able to work with a host 
government, DFAIT, working with CIDA, can support civil society initiatives that are 
deemed to be most progressive or effective.  It would also mean that despite the 
suggestions of some proponents of a human rights agenda who contend that such an 
approach must maintain consistency in its application, an international human rights 
policy would remain constant, but the specifics of programming would be contextual.296  
But behind all of these initiatives, there must be an approach that places human rights at 
the fore of Canadian foreign policy.   
In a multilateral setting, a human rights approach means fostering and reinforcing 
the consensus on human rights.  It means bringing new partners into the fold by 
demonstrating that a human rights approach can be flexible in its implementation, while 
still maintaining its indivisible and universal integrity.  By building on this consensus and 
by eschewing empty rhetoric for decisive action, Canada could find that its influence, and 
more importantly, its effectiveness, improves.  It requires a constant effort towards 
building a better society for Canadians and the intrnational community.  As part of this, 
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Canada must elevate the importance of protecting and promoting human rights at home, 
so as to avoid undermining a robust international human rights policy abroad.   
Finally, considering that national interests as defined here transcend partisan 
politics and changes in state administration, the case study of Afghanistan speaks to the 
importance of defining a foreign policy in Canada th t is both long term in its perspective 
and supported by adequate resources. There must be enough political stability within 
DFAIT to allow for the production of effective policies that are creative enough to 
incorporate this concept of human rights protection and promotion as integral to 
Canadian interests. Canadian foreign policy-makers must also reject what Nossal 
describes as their tendency to view Canada’s potential human rights effectiveness in 
pessimistic terms.297  Long-term outlooks that consider Canada’s national interests and 
human rights promotion as mutually inclusive concepts are necessary for Canada to 
reduce the gap between its human rights rhetoric and its foreign policy actions.  
There are no easy answers.  A human rights approach holds promise, but cannot 
promise change.  What works in one case might not work in the next.  What seemed to be 
the right policy may eventually yield a negative outcome.  Good international citizenship 
now requires the development of policies that will be pertinent to relations with a wide 
and varied range of states.298  Canada might be required to collaborate with actors 
traditionally considered its adversaries. A human rights foreign policy requires the 
difficult task of developing creative plans, priorities, and programs, as well as a humble 
acknowledgement of the limitations of a human rights agenda.  However, the 
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opportunities and the value of such an approach, especially regarding the potential 
development of a way to end the war in Afghanistan, mean that it is a risk worth taking. 
In the post-Cold War era, the complex associations between failed and fragile 
states and security became increasingly part of interna ional relations.  This dialogue 
focused on human security and terrorism, and considered failed and fragile states a threat 
to state security and international order.  Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement 
claimed that, “Among the emerging threats we face are those resulting from a large 
number of weak, ineffectively governed states.”299  Suppressing the potential threats 
emanating from failed and fragile states is precisely the kind of common interest that 
unites international society.  The imperative of improving the plight of failed and fragile 
states indicates that the prospects of a human rights approach described in this work 
could be applied more generally to international engagement in other fragile states, with 
appropriate consideration for context.  What this amounts to is a proposal for limiting and 
responding to instability and conflict internationally, as well as for improving the plight 
of billions of people around the world. 
The goal of this work has been to make a forceful case for the inclusion of human 
rights in Canadian foreign policy by articulating the positive relationship between human 
rights and Canada’s national interests.  Under such an approach, Canadian leaders and 
decision-makers would include human rights in foreign policy axiomatically because it is 
in Canada’s best interests to do so.  This argument is not limited to the Canadian context 
and an examination of its applicability could be extended to other members of 
international society.  There are myriad opportunities for related research, such as the 
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relationship between morality and the state and human rights and morality, but the aim 
here has simply been to be part of an evolving discus ion on human rights norms in 
international relations. This work reinforces the importance of human rights 
internationally and advocates strongly for the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy. 
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